Nuremberg Trial – The Twenty-sixth Day

Twenty-Sixth Day:

Thursday, 3rd January, 1946

 

LT. HARRIS: If the Tribunal will recall, at the end of the last session we had finished reading a portion of the sworn interrogation of the Gaustabsamtsleiter under the Gauleiter of Munich and had touched on the point where he said that Kaltenbrunner issued directives to Dachau to transport Western European prisoners by truck to Switzerland and to march the remaining inmates into the Tyrol.

I now offer as Exhibit next in order the first five pages of the interrogation report of Gottlieb Berger, Chief of the head office of the S.S., made under oath on 20th September, 1945, in the course of these proceedings. You will find these pages at the end of the Document Book and this is offered as Exhibit US.A. 529. These pages have been translated into German and made available to the defendants.

THE PRESIDENT: Does it have a number?

LT. HARRIS: It has no PS number, Sir. It is at the very end of the Document Book. I wish to read only one question and answer from these pages; and I refer to the last question and answer Page 3 of the Exhibit:

“Q: Assuming, only for the purposes of this discussion, that these atrocities that we hear about are true, who do you think is primarily responsible?

“A: The first one, the Commandant; the second one, Gluecks; because he was practically responsible for all the interior direction of the camps. If one wants to be exact, one would have to find out how the information service between the camp Commandant and Gluecks actually operated. I want to give you the following example: During the night of the 22nd and 23rd April I was sent to Munich. As I entered the city, I met a group of perhaps 120 men dressed in the suits of the concentration camps. I asked the guard who was with them, ‘What about these men?’ He told me that these men were marching by foot to the Alps. Firstly, I sent him back to Dachau. Then I wrote a letter to the Commandant, to send no more people by foot to any place, but, whenever the Allies advanced any further, to give over the camp completely. I did that on my own responsibility and I told him that I came straight from Berlin and that I can be found in my service post in Munich. The Commandant, or his deputy, telephoned at about twelve o’clock and told me that he had received this order from Kaltenbrunner after he had been asked by the Gauleiter of Munich, the Reichskommissar.”

The tenth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the Security Police and S.D. is the persecution of the Jews. This crime, of course, continued after 30th January, 1943, and evidence has heretofore been received that the persecutions continued until and were accelerated toward the end of the war. Kaltenbrunner took a personal interest in such matters, as is indicated by Document 2519-PS, which is offered as Exhibit next in order, Exhibit US.A. 530. This exhibit consists of a memorandum and an affidavit, and I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the affidavit. Quoting from the affidavit:

“I, Henri Monneray, being first duly sworn, depose and say that since 12th September, 1945, I have been and I am the member of the French staff for the prosecution of Axis Criminality and have been pursuing my official duties in this connection in Nuremberg, Germany, since 12th October, 1945.

In the course of my official duties, at the instruction of the French Chief Prosecutor, I examined the personal document of the defendant-”

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all of this? What is the object of this affidavit?

LT. HARRIS: To show that this document was derived from the personal effects of the defendant Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: You can leave out the immaterial parts.

LT. HARRIS: Very good, Sir. Passing to the last sentence of the affidavit:

“Said Document 2519-PS is the document which I found in the envelope containing Kaltenbrunner’s personal papers.”

I now read the memorandum:

“Radio message to Gruppenfuehrer S.S. Major General Fegelein, Headquarters of the Fuehrer, through Sturmbannfuehrer S.S. Major Sansoni, Berlin:

Please inform the Reichsfuehrer S.S. and report to the Fuehrer that all arrangements against Jews, political and concentration camp internees in the Protectorate have been taken care of by me personally to-day. The situation there is one of calmness, fear of Soviet successes and hope of an occupation by the Western enemies.

Kaltenbrunner.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. BIDDLE): That is not dated?

LT. HARRIS: This is not dated.

The eleventh crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible is the persecution of the Churches. It is unnecessary to present specific evidence that this crime continued after 30th January, 1943, since this was one of the fundamental purposes of the Security Police and S.D., as has already been shown.

These are the crimes for which the defendant Kaltenbrunner must answer. As to his criminal intent, there is no need to go outside the record before this Tribunal. On 1st December, 1945, in these proceedings the witness Lahousen was asked on cross-examination, “Do you know Mr. Kaltenbrunner?”

After describing his meeting with Kaltenbrunner on a day in Munich when a university student and his sister were arrested and executed for distributing leaflets from the auditorium, Lahousen said – and I wish to quote only to two sentences on Page 324 (Part I.) of the transcript:

“I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time that I saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name was known to me. Of course, Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, and witnesses were there, and everybody was under the terrible impression of what had happened, and Kaltenbrunner spoke about that to Canaris in a manner for which cynicism would be a very mild description. This is the only thing I can say to this question.”

Kaltenbrunner was a life-long fanatical Nazi. He was the leader of the S.S. in Austria prior to the Anschluss and played a principal role in the betrayal of his native country to the Nazi Conspirators. As higher S.S. and Police Leader in Austria after the Anschluss, he supervised and had knowledge of the activities of the Gestapo and the S.D. in Austria. The Mauthausen concentration camp was established in his jurisdiction and he visited it several times. On at least one occasion he observed the gas chamber in action. With this knowledge and background he accepted, in January, 1943, appointment as Chief of the Security Police and S.D., the very agencies which sent such victims to their deaths. He held that office to the end, rising to great prominence in the S.S. and the German Police and receiving high honours from Hitler. Like other leading Nazis, Kaltenbrunner sought power; to gain it, he made his covenant with crime.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, next will be some witnesses and Colonel Amen will handle the interrogation.

COLONEL JOHN H. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I wish to call, as a witness for the prosecution, Mr. Otto Ohlendorf. Your Lordship will note that his name appears under Amt III on the chart on the wall.

THE PRESIDENT: What did you say appeared?

Q. The name of this witness appears under Amt III of the chart, R.S.H.A., the large square, the third section down.

THE PRESIDENT: I see it.

Otto Ohlendorf, will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath.)

BY COLONEL AMEN:

Q. Where were you born?

A. In Hohen Egelsen.

Q. How old are you?

A. Thirty-eight years old.

Q. When, if ever, did you become a member of the National Socialist Party?

A. 1925.

Q. When, if ever, did you become a member of the S.A.?

A. For the first time in 1926.

Q. When, if ever, did you become a member of the S.S.?

A. I must correct myself. I answered the first question as if I were speaking of my membership in the S.S.

Q. When did you become a member of the S.A.?

A. In the year 1923.

Q. When, if ever, did you join the S.D.?

A. In 1936.

Q. What was your last position in the S.D.?

A. Amt Chief of Amt III in the R.S.H.A..

Q. Turning to the chart on the wall behind your back, will you tell the Tribunal whether you can identify that chart in any way?

A. This chart was seen previously by me and worked on by me and I can consequently identify it.

Q. What, if anything, did you have to do with making up that chart?

A. This chart was made during my interrogation.

COLONEL AMEN: For the information of the Tribunal, the chart of which the witness speaks is Exhibit US.A. 493.

Q. Will you tell the Tribunal whether that chart correctly portrays the basic organization of the R.S.H.A., as well as the position of Kaltenbrunner, the Gestapo, and the S.D. in the German Police system?

A. The organisation, as represented in that chart, is a correct representation of the organisation of the R.S.H.A. It shows correctly the position of the S.A. as well as the State Police, the Criminal Police, and the S.D.

Q. Referring once more to the chart, please indicate your position in the R.S.H.A. and state for what period you continued to serve in that capacity.

(At this point the witness pointed to Amt III on the chart.)

Q. What were the positions of Kaltenbrunner, Mueller, and Eichmann in the R.S.H.A., and state for what periods of time each of them continued to serve in his respective capacity?

A. Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei and the S.D.; as such, he was also Chief of the R.S.H.A., the internal organisational term for the office of the chief of the Sicherheitspolizei and the S.D.

Kaltenbrunner occupied this position from 30th January, 1943, until the end of the war. Mueller was Chief of Amt IV, the Gestapo. When the Gestapo was established, he became Deputy Chief, and as such he subsequently was appointed Chief of Amt IV of the R.S.H.A.. He occupied this position until the end of the war.

Eichmann occupied a position in Amt IV under Mueller and worked on the Jewish problem from 1940 on. To my knowledge, he also occupied this position until the end of the war.

Q. Will you tell us for what period of time you continued to serve as Chief of Amt III?

A. I was Chief of Amt III from 1939 to 1945.

Q. Turning now to the designation “Mobile Units” with the Army, shown in the lower right-hand corner of the chart, please explain to the Tribunal the significance of the terms “Einsatzgruppe” and “Einsatzkommando”.

A. The concept “Einsatzgruppe” was established after an agreement between the Chiefs of the R.S.H.A., O.K.W., and O.K.H., in regard to the use of the Sipo in the area of operation. The concept “Einsatzgruppe” first appeared during the Polish campaign.

The agreement with the O.K.H. and O.K.W., however, was first arrived at before the beginning of the Russian campaign. This agreement specified that an official of the Sipo and the S.D. should be assigned to the Army Groups, or the Armies, and that this official would have at his disposal mobile units of the Sipo and the S.D. in the form of Einsatzgruppen, subdivided into Einsatzkommandos. The Einsatzkommandos should be assigned to the Army Units as needed, to the particular Army Group or Army.

Q. State, if you know, whether prior to the campaign against Soviet Russia, any agreement was entered into between the O.K.W., O.K.H., and R.S.H.A.?

A. Yes, the Einsatzgruppen, just described by me, and the Einsatzkommandos were used in the Russian campaign, according to a written agreement between the O.K.W., O.K.H., and R.S.H.A..

Q. How do you know that there was such a written agreement?

A. I was often present when the negotiations which Schellenberg conducted with the O.K.H. and OKW were being discussed, and I also had a written copy of this agreement in my own hands when I took over the Einsatzgruppen.

Q. Explain to the Tribunal who Schellenberg was. What position, if any, did he occupy?

A. Schellenberg was finally the Chief of Amt VI in the R.S.H.A.; at the time when he was conducting these negotiations as ordered by Heydrich, he belonged to the Amt.

Q. On approximately what date did these negotiations take place?

A. The negotiations took several weeks. The agreement must have been reached about one or two weeks before the beginning of the Russian campaign.

Q. Did you yourself ever see a copy of this written agreement?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have occasion to work with this written agreement?

A. Yes.

Q. On more than one occasion?

A. Yes; and in regard to more than one question which had to do with the use of Einsatzgruppen in the Army.

Q. Do you know where the original or any copy of that agreement is located to-day?

A. No, I do not.

Q. To the best of your knowledge and recollection, please explain to the Tribunal the entire substance of this written agreement.

A. First of all, the agreement stated the fact that Einsatzgruppen should be set up and that Einsatzkommandos should be used for joint efforts in this operation. Up to that time the Army had completely taken over the tasks that the Sipo should have done itself.

THE PRESIDENT: What is it that you say the Einsatzkommandos did under the agreement?

A. The second was the authority of the Army in regard to the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos. The agreement specified that the Army Groups or Armies should be responsible for marching and maintenance so far as the Einsatzgruppen were concerned. Particular instructions came from the Chief of the Sipo and S.D.

COL. AMEN: Q. Let us understand. Is it correct that an Einsatz Group was to be attached to each Army Group or Army?

A. Every Army Group was to have attached to it an Einsatzgruppe. The Einsatzkommandos, in their turn, were to be attached to the Armies by the Army Group.

Q. And was the Army Command to determine the area within which the Einsatz Group was to operate?

A. The operational region of the Einsatzgruppe was determined by the fact that the Einsatzgruppe was attached to a specific Army Group and therefore marched with it, whereas the Einsatzkommandos functioned in territories as determined by the Army Group or Army.

Q. Did the agreement also provide that the Army Command was to direct the time during which they were to operate?

A. That was included under the concept “March.”

Q. And also to direct any additional tasks they were to perform?

A. Yes. As far as the actual instructions of the Chiefs of the Sipo and S.D. were concerned, they were guided by the general practice that they could issue orders to the Army if the operational situation made it necessary.

Q. What did this agreement provide with respect to the attachment of the Einsatz Group Command to the Army Command?

A. I cannot remember whether anything specific was said about that. At any rate, an attachment was established.

Q. Do you recall any other provisions of this written agreement?

A. I believe I can state the essential content of that agreement.

Q. What position did you occupy with respect to this agreement?

A. From June, 1941, to the death of Heydrich in June, 1942, I led Einsatzgruppe D, and was the Deputy of the Chief of the Sipo and the S.D. with the 11th Army.

Q. And when was Heydrich’s death?

A. Heydrich was wounded at the end of May, 1942, and died on 4th June, 1942.

Q. How much advance notice, if any, did you have of the campaign against Soviet Russia?

A. About four weeks.

Q. How many Einsatz Groups were there, and who were their respective leaders?

A. There were four Einsatzgruppen, Group A, B, C and D. Chief of Einsatzgruppe A was Stahlecker; Chief of Einsatzgruppe B was Nebe; Chief of Einsatzgruppe C Dr. Rausche, and later, Dr. Thomas; Chief of Einsatzgruppe D, Bierkamp.

Q. To which army was Group D attached?

A. Group D was not attached to any Army Group, but was attached directly to the 11th Army.

Q. Where did Group D operate?

A. Group D operated in the Southern Ukraine.

Q. Will you describe in more detail the nature and extent of the area in which Group D originally operated, naming the cities or territories?

A. The most Northern city was Czernowitz; then Southward to Mogilev-Podelsk; South-west to Odessa; North-east of that, Melitopol, Mariupol, Taganrog, Rostov and the Crimea.

Q. What was the ultimate objective of Group D?

A. Group D was held in reserve for the Caucasus. An Army Group was provided for this operation.

Q. When did Group D commence its move into Soviet Russia?

A. Group D left Duegen on 21st June, reaching Romania in 21 days. There the first Einsatzkommandos were already being demanded by the Army, and they marched at once to the goals set by the Army. The entire Einsatzgruppe was made use of at the beginning of July.

Q. You are referring to the 11th Army?

A. Yes.

Q. In what respects, if any, were the official duties of the Einsatz Groups concerned with Jews and Communist Commissars?

A. As far as the question of Jews and Communists is concerned, the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were orally instructed by their leaders before the march.

Q. What were their instructions with respect to the Jews and the Communist functionaries?

A. They were instructed that in the field of activity of the Einsatzgruppe in Russian territory the Jews, as well as the political Soviet Commissars, were to be liquidated.

Q. And when you say “liquidated” do you mean “killed?”

A. I mean “killed.”

Q. Prior to the opening of the Soviet campaign, did you attend a conference at Pretz?

A. Yes, it was a discussion at which the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos were informed of the goals of their activity and were given the necessary commands.

Q. Who was present at that conference?

A. The Chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen and the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos and Streckenbach of the R.S.H.A., who transmitted the orders of Heydrich and Himmler.

Q. What were those orders?

A. Those were the general orders regarding the work of the Sipo, which aided the liquidation order which I have already mentioned.

Q. And that conference took place on approximately what date?

A. About three or four days before our march.

Q. So that before you commenced to march into Soviet Russia, you received orders at this conference to exterminate the Jews and Communist functionaries, in addition to the regular professional work of the Security Police and SD; is that correct?

A. That is right.

Q. Did you, personally, have any conversation with Himmler, respecting any communication from Himmler to the Chiefs of Army Groups and Armies concerning this mission?

A. Yes. Himmler informed me that before the beginning of the Russian campaign Hitler, in a conference with the Commander of the Army, had stated this task and had instructed the High Commander to provide the necessary support in regard to it.

Q. So that you can testify that the Chiefs of the Army Groups and the Armies had been similarly informed of those orders for the liquidation of the Jews and Soviet functionaries?

A. I believe that it is not correct in this particular form. They had no orders for liquidation. The order for the liquidation originated with Himmler, but since this liquidation took place in the operational region of the High Command, of the Army Groups or the Army, the Army was ordered to support these measures. Without these instructions to the Army, the Einsatzgruppe in this sense would not have been possible.

Q. Did you have any other conversation with Himmler concerning this order?

A. Yes, in the late summer of 1941 Himmler was in Nikolaiev. He assembled the leaders and men of the Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos and repeated to them the orders for liquidation with the remark that the leaders and men who were taking part in the liquidation bore no personal responsibility for the execution of these orders. The responsibility was his, alone, as well, of course, as that of the Fuehrer.

Q. And you yourself heard that said?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether this mission of the Einsatz Group was known to the Army Group Commanders?

A. This order and the execution of these orders were known to the High Commander of the Army.

Q. How do you know that?

A. Through conferences with the Army and through instructions which were given by the Army in reference to this execution.

Q. Was the mission of the Einsatz Groups and the agreement between O.K.W., O.K.H. and R.S.H.A. known to the other leaders in the R.S.H.A.?

A. At least some of them knew, since some of the leaders were also active in the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in the course of time. Furthermore, the leaders who had to do with organisation also knew it.

Q. Most of the leaders came from the R.S.H.A., did they not?

A. Which leaders?

Q. Of the Einsatz Groups.

A. No, one cannot say that. The leaders in the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos came from the entire Reich.

Q. Do you know whether the mission and the agreement were also known to Kaltenbrunner?

A. After his entry into service Kaltenbrunner had to concern himself with these questions and consequently must have known the background of the Einsatzgruppen which were dealt with in his own office.

Q. Who was the commanding officer of the 11th Army?

A. At first, Ritter von Schober; later, Von Mannstein.

Q. Will you tell the Tribunal in what way or ways the commanding officers of the 11th Army directed or supervised Einsatz Group D in carrying out its liquidation activities?

A. An order from the 1st Army came to Nikolaiev, stating that liquidations were to take place only at a distance of not less than 200 kilometers from the Headquarters of the High Commander Mannheim.

Q. Do you recall any other occasion?

A. In Simferopol, the Army High Command gave the proper Einsatzkommandos further orders to hasten the liquidation, on the grounds that in this region there was a great housing shortage.

Q. Do you know how many persons were liquidated by Einsatz Group D, under your direction?

A. In the year between June, 1941, to June, 1942, the Einsatzkommandos announced 90,000 people liquidated.

Q. Did that include men, women, and children?

A. Yes.

Q. On what do you base those figures?

A. On reports sent by the Einsatzkommandos to the Einsatzgruppen.

Q. Were those reports submitted to you?

A. Yes.

Q. And you saw them and read them?

A. I beg your pardon?

Q. And you saw and read those reports, personally?

A. Yes.

Q. And it is on those reports that you base the figures you have given the Tribunal?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how those figures compare with the number of persons liquidated by other Einsatz Groups?

A. The figures known to me from other Einsatzgruppen are materially larger.

Q. That was due to what factor?

A. I believe that to a large extent the figures submitted by the other Einsatzgruppen were exaggerated.

Q. Did you see reports of liquidations from the other Einsatz Groups from time to time?

A. Yes.

Q. And those reports showed liquidations exceeding those of Group D; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you personally supervise mass executions of these individuals?

A. I was present at mass executions for purposes of inspection.

Q. Will you explain to the Tribunal in detail how an individual mass execution was carried out?

A. A local Einsatzkommando attempted to collect all the Jews in one area. The registration of the Jews was performed by the Jews themselves.

Q. On what pretext, if any, were they rounded up?

A. On the pretext that they were to be re-located.

Q. Will you continue?

A. After the registration, the Jews were collected at a certain place. From there they were later led to the place of execution. The execution was carried out in a military fashion.

Q. In what way were they transported to the place of execution?

A. They were transported to the place of execution in a wagon – always only as many as could be executed immediately. In this way the attempt was made to keep the span of time in which the victims knew what was about to happen to them until the time of their actual execution as short as possible.

Q. Was that your idea?

A. Yes.

Q. And after they were shot what was done with the bodies?

A. The bodies were buried in the trenches.

Q. What determination, if any, was made as to whether the persons were actually dead?

A. The unit leaders had the order to watch out for that and to administer the coup de grace themselves if necessary.

Q. And who would do that?

A. Either the unit leader himself or somebody designated by him.

Q. In what positions were the victims shot?

A. Standing or kneeling.

Q. What was done with the personal property and clothing of the persons executed?

A. All personal property of value was collected at the time of the shooting, confiscated and handed over to the R.S.H.A. or the Finance Minister. At first the clothing was divided up, but in the winter of 1942 it was taken by the N.S.V. and disposed of by that organisation.

Q. All their personal property was registered at the time?

A. Only the objects of value were registered. The other objects were not.

Q. What happened to the garments which the victims were wearing when they went to the place of execution?

A. They were obliged to take off their outer garments immediately before the execution.

Q. All of them?

A. The outer garments, yes.

Q. How about the rest of the garments they were wearing?

A. They were allowed to keep their underclothing.

Q. Was that true of not only your group but of the other Einsatz Groups?

A. That was the order in my Einsatzgruppe. Other Einsatzgruppen handled the matter differently.

Q. In what way did they handle it?

A. A few of the Einsatz leaders did not employ the military way of liquidation and killed the victims simply by shooting them in the back of the neck.

Q. And you objected to that procedure?

A. I was against that procedure, yes.

Q. For what reason?

A. Because for the victims as well as those who carried out the executions that was an unnecessary spiritual suffering.

Q. Now, what was done with the property collected by the Einsatzkommandos from these victims?

A. In so far as it was a question of objects of value, they were sent to the R.S.H.A. in Berlin or to the Reich Ministry of Finance. The articles which could be used in the operational area were used there immediately.

Q. For example, what happened to gold and silver taken from the victims?

A. That was, as I have just said, turned over to the Reich Ministry of Finance in Berlin.

Q. How do you know that?

A. I can remember that it was actually handled in that way in Simferopol.

Q. How about watches, for example, taken from the victims?

A. At the request of the Army watches were put at the disposal of the Front.

Q. Were all victims, including men, women, and children, executed in the same manner?

A. Until the spring of 1942, yes. Then an order came from Himmler that in the future women and children should be killed only in gas vans.

Q. How had the women and children been killed previously?

A. In the same way as the men – by shooting.

Q. What, if anything, was done about burying the victims after they had been executed?

A. At first the Kommandos filled the graves so that signs of the execution could not be seen any more, and then levelled the graves with Arbeitskommandos from the population.

Q. Referring to the gas vans which you said you received in the spring of 1942, what order did you receive with respect to the use of these vans?

A. That these gas vans should be used in the future for the killing of women and children.

Q. Will you explain to the Tribunal the construction of these vans and their appearance?

A. The actual purpose of these vans could not be recognised from the outside. They were practically closed trucks. They were so constructed that when the motor ran, the gas was conducted into the van causing death of the occupants in 10 to 15 minutes.

Q. Explain in detail just how one of these vans was used for an execution.

A. The vans were loaded with the victims and driven to the place of burial, which was usually the same as that used for the mass executions. The time needed for transportation was long enough to insure the death of the passengers.

Q. How were the victims induced to enter the vans?

A. They were told that they were to be transported to another locality.

Q. How was the gas turned on?

A. I am not familiar with the technical details.

Q. How long did it take to kill the victims ordinarily?

A. About 10 to 15 minutes, the victims did not notice what was going on.

Q. How many persons could be killed simultaneously one such van?

A. The vans were of various sizes, anywhere from 15 to 25 persons.

Q. Did you receive reports from those persons operating these vans from time to time?

A. I did not understand the question.

Q. Did you receive reports from those who were working on the vans?

A. I received the report that the Einsatzkommandos did not like to use the vans.

Q. Why not?

A. Because the burial of the occupants was a great ordeal for the members of the Einsatzkommandos.

Q. Now, will you tell the Tribunal who furnished these vans to the Einsatz Groups?

A. The gas vans did not belong to the motor pool of the Einsatzgruppen but came from a special Kommando of the Einsatzgruppe. This Kommando also had charge of the construction of the vans. These vans were assigned to the Einsatzgruppen by the R.S.H.A.

Q. Were the vans supplied to all of the different Einsatz Groups?

A. I cannot say that. I only know about Einsatzgruppe D, and indirectly about Einsatzgruppe C, both of which had such vans.

Q. Are you familiar with the letter from Becker to Rauf with respect to these gas vans?

A. I saw this letter during my interrogation.

COLONEL AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I am referring to Document 501-PS, Exhibit USA 288, being a letter already in evidence, a letter from Becker to Rauf.

Q. Will you tell the Tribunal who Becker was?

A. As far as I recall, Becker was the builder of the vans. It was he who was in charge of the vans for Einsatzgruppe D.

Q. Who was Rauf?

A. Rauf was group leader in Amt II of the R.S.H.A. He was in charge of motor vehicles and other things at that time.

Q. Can you identify that letter in any way?

A. The contents seem to bear out my experiences and are therefore probably correct. (Document 501-PS was handed to the witness.) Yes.

Q. Will you look at the letter before you and tell us whether you can identify it in any way?

A. I recognise the external appearance of the letter as well as the sign “R” (Rauf) on it, and the reference to the man who took care of the motor vehicles under Rauf seems to testify to its authenticity. The contents bear out the experiences which I had at that time.

Q. So that you believe it to be an authentic document?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Will you now lay it aside on the table there?

Referring to your previous testimony, will you explain to the Tribunal why you believe that the type of execution ordered by you, namely, military, was preferable to the shooting in the neck procedure adopted by the other Einsatz Groups?

A. On the one hand, the aim was that the individual leaders and men should be able to carry out the executions in a military fashion acting on order and should have to make no decision of their own. That is, it should take place only by order. On the other hand, it was known to me that in the case of individual executions emotional disturbances could not be avoided since the victims discovered too soon that they were to be executed and thereby were subjected to prolonged nervous strain. Likewise, it seemed intolerable to me that the individual leaders and men were forced in this way to form their own decisions in the killing of a large number of people.

Q. In what manner did you determine which were the Jews to be executed?

A. That was not part up to me, but the identification of the Jews was done by the Jews themselves, since the registration was carried out by a Jewish Council of Elders.

Q. Did the amount of Jewish blood have anything to do with it?

A. I cannot remember the details, but I believe that in this case half-Jews were also included in the concept “Jew.”

Q. What organisations furnished most of the officer personnel of the Einsatz Groups and Einsatzkommandos?

A. I did not understand the question.

Q. What organisations furnished most of the officer personnel of the Einsatz Groups?

A. The leadership personnel was furnished by the State Police, the Kripo, and, to a lesser extent, by the S.D.

Q. Kripo?

A. Yes, the Kripo. The State Police, the Criminal Police and, and to a lesser extent, the S.D.

Q. Were there any other sources of personnel?

A. Yes; the great masses of men employed were furnished by the Waffen S.S. and the Ordinary Police. The State Police and the Kripo furnished the experts for the most part and the troops were furnished by the Waffen S.S. and the Ordinary Police.

Q. How about the Waffen S.S.?

A. The Waffen S.S. was supposed to supply the Einsatzgruppen with one company, just as was the Ordinary Police.

Q. How about the Ordinary Police?

A. The Ordinary Police [Ordnungspolizei] also furnished a company to the Einsatzgruppen.

Q. What was the size of Einsatz Group D and its operating area as compared with the other Einsatz Groups?

A. I estimate that Einsatzgruppe D was two-thirds to one- half as large as the other Einsatzgruppen. That changed in the course of time. Individual Einsatzgruppen were in the course of time greatly enlarged.

COLONEL AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I have other questions relating to organisational matters which I think would clarify some of the evidence which has already been in part received by the Tribunal; but I don’t want to take the time of the Tribunal unless they feel that they want any more such testimony. I thought, perhaps, if any members of the Tribunal had questions they would ask this witness directly, because he is the best informed on these organisational matters of anyone who will be presented in Court.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

(A recess was taken.)

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not think that it is necessary to go further into the organisational questions at this stage, but it is a matter which must be really decided by you because you know what the nature of the evidence which you are considering is. So far as the Tribunal is concerned, they are satisfied at the present stage to leave the matter where it is. But there is one aspect of the witness’s evidence which the Tribunal would like you to investigate, and that is whether the practices of which he has been speaking continued after 1942, and for how long.

BY COLONEL AMEN:

Q. Can you state whether the liquidation practices which you have described continued after 1942 and, if so, for how long a period of time thereafter?

A. I do not think that the basic order was ever lifted. But I cannot remember sufficient details to enable me to make concrete statements on this subject, at least not in reference to Russia; for very shortly thereafter the retreat began, so that the operational region of the Einsatzgruppen became smaller and smaller. I do know whether other Einsatzgruppen with similar orders were provided for other areas.

Q. The question was up to what date does your personal knowledge of these liquidation activities go.

A. As far as the liquidation of Jews is concerned, I know that appropriate withdrawals of the order were made about six months before the conclusion of the war. Furthermore, I saw a document according to which the liquidation of Soviet Commissars was to be terminated. I cannot recall a specific date.

Q. Do you know whether in fact it was so terminated?

A. Yes, I believe so.

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q. The Tribunal would like to know the number of men in your Einsatz Group.

A. There were about five hundred people in my Einsatzgruppe, besides those who were added to the group from the country itself to help out.

Q. Including them, did you say?

A. Excluding those who were brought into the group from the land itself.

Q. Do you know how many there would be in other groups?

A. I should estimate that at the beginning, seven to eight hundred men; but, as I said before, this number changed rapidly in the course of time for this reason, that individual Einsatzgruppen themselves acquired new people or succeeded in getting additional personnel from the R.S.H.A..

Q. The numbers increased, did they?

A. Yes, the numbers increased.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

COLONEL AMEN: Now, here are perhaps just a half dozen of these questions I would like to ask, because I do think they might clear up, in the minds of the Tribunal, some of the evidence which has gone before. I shall be very brief, if that is satisfactory to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

BY COLONEL AMEN:

Q. Will you explain the significance of the different widths of the blue lines on the chart?

A. The thick blue line between the name Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer S.S. and Chief of the German Police and the initials R.S.H.A. is designed to show the identity of the offices of the chiefs of the Sicherheitspolizei and the S.D. and their tasks. This is a department in which ministerial questions of leadership as well as individual executive matters were treated, that is to say, the closed circle of operations of the Sipo and the S.D. The organisational scheme, however, seen from the legal administrative point of view, represents an illegal state of affairs since the R.S.H.A. never actually had official validity.

The formal, legal situation was different from that which appears on this chart. Party and State offices were amalgamated here with different channels. Under this designation neither orders nor laws with a legal basis were issued. That is due to the fact that the State Police, in its ministerial capacity, was subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior just as before, whereas the S.D., despite this organisation, was an organ of the Party.

Therefore if I wished to reproduce this scheme legally according to the administrative situation, I should have to put, for example, in place of Amt IV the Amt Political Police of the former Sicherheitspolizei Hauptamt. This Amt Political Police existed formally to the very end and had its origin in the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time, the Secret State Police Amt, the Central Office of the Prussian Secret State Police, the leading organ of all the political police offices of the different provinces [Laender], continued to exist formally.

Thus, ministerial questions continued to be handled under the leadership of the Minister of the Interior; in so far as the emphasis on the formal competence of the Ministry of the Interior was necessary, it appeared under the heading “Reich Minister of the Interior” with the filing notice “Pol,” the former designation of the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior and the appropriate filing notice of the competent department of the former Sicherheitspolizei Hauptamt. For example, filing notice “Pol-S” meant Sicherheitspolizei; “V” meant Amt Verwaltung und Recht (Department Administration and Law).

The R.S.H.A. was therefore nothing more than a camouflage designation which did not correctly represent the actual conditions but gave the Chief of the Sipo and the S.D. as a collective designation for the Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei Hauptamt and the Chief of the S.D. Hauptamt (an office held until 1939) the opportunity of using one or the other letterhead at any given time.

At the same time it gave him the opportunity of an internal amalgamation of all forces and the opportunity of a division of activity-areas according to the point of view of practical effectiveness. But the fact remains that in this department State offices did remain in a way dependent on the Ministry of the Interior, and similarly the departments of the S.D. remained Party departments.

The S.D. Hauptamt, or the R.S.H.A., had formally only the significance of an S.S. Main Office, a main office in which the S.S. members of the Sipo and the S.D. belonged to the S.S. But the S.S., that is to say, Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer S.S., gave these state offices no official authority to issue orders.

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q. I am not sure that I follow altogether what you have been saying, but is what you have been saying the reason why you are shown on the chart as concerned with Amt III, which refers, apparently, only to inside Germany, while, according to your evidence, you were the head of Einsatz Group D, which was operating outside Germany?

A. The fact that I led an Einsatzgruppe had nothing to do with the fact that I was also Chief of Amt III. I was given that as an individual, not as Chief of Amt III; and in my capacity as leader of an Einsatzgruppe I came into a completely new function and into an office completely separate from the former one.

Q. I see. And did it involve that you left Germany and went into the area invaded in the Soviet Union?

A. Yes.

BY COLONEL AMEN:

Q. Will you explain the significance of the dotted blue lines, as compared with the solid blue lines on the right hand side of the chart?

A. The solid lines indicate a direct official channels, whereas the dotted lines signify that here as a rule there were no direct channels.

Q. Was the term “S.D.” ever used to include both the Sipo and the S.D.?

A. In the course of years the term “S.D.” was used more and more incorrectly. It came to be established as an abbreviation for Sipo and S.D., without actually being suitable for that. “S.D.” was originally simply a designation for the fact that someone belonged to the S.S.via the S.D. Main Office. When the S.D. Main Office was dissolved and was taken over into the R.S.H.A., the question arose as to whether the designation S.D., which was also worn as insignia on the sleeve of the particular S.S. man, should be replaced by another insignia or a new abbreviation, e.g. R.S.H.A.. Things did not reach that point because the camouflage of the R.S.H.A. would thereby have been endangered. But when, for example, I read in a Fuehrer order that in France people were to be turned over to the S.D., that was a case in point of the false use of the designation S.D., since there were no such offices in France, and, on the other hand, the S.D., in so far as it functioned in departments, e.g., Amt III, in offices, had no executive power but was purely an intelligence organ.

Q. Briefly, what was the relationship between the S.S. and the Gestapo?

A. The relationship between the S.S. and Gestapo was this: The Reichsfuehrer S.S., as such, took over the tasks of the police and attempted to combine more closely the State Police and the S.S., that is to say, on the one hand to employ only those members of the State Police who were eligible for the S.S., and, on the other hand, to use the institutions of the S.S., e.g., education and training of the younger generation by the Waffen-S.S., in order in this way to draw the younger generation into the State Police. This amalgamation was later extended by him in an attempt to bring about the same relationship between the S.S. and the Ministry of the Interior, i.e., the whole internal administration.

Q. About how many full-time agents and honourary auxiliary personnel did the S.D. employ?

A. One cannot use the concept SD in this connection either. It is necessary to distinguish here between Amt III and Amt VI. Amt III, as the interior intelligence service, had about three thousand main office members, including men and women. On the other hand, the interior intelligence service worked essentially with honourary personnel, that is to say, with men and women who could serve the internal intelligence services with their professional experiences and with experiences based on their surroundings. I would judge that the number of these persons was roughly thirty thousand.

Q. Will you briefly give the Tribunal a general example of how a typical transaction was handled through the channels indicated on the chart?

A. First, a general example, invented to make things clear. Himmler discovered through experience that more and more saboteurs were being dropped from planes into Germany and were endangering transportation and factory sites. He told this to Kaltenbrunner in the latter’s capacity as Chief of the Sipo and instructed him to make his organisation aware of this state of affairs and to take measures to see to it that these saboteurs would be seized as soon and as completely as possible.

Kaltenbrunner instructed Amt IV, that is to say, the State Police, with the preparation of the necessary order to the regional offices. This order was drawn up by the competent office of experts in Amt IV and was either transmitted by Mueller directly to the State Police offices in the Reich or, what is more probable because of the importance of the question and because of necessity and in order to bring to the attention of the other offices and officials to this fact, was given by him to Kaltenbrunner, who signed it and issued it to the regional offices in the Reich.

On the basis of this order it was, for example, determined that the State Police offices should report the measures they were taking as well as any successes they might have. These reports went back through the same channels from the regional offices to the offices of experts in Amt IV, thence to the Chief of Amt IV, thence to the Chief of the R.S.H.A., Kaltenbrunner, and thence to the Chief of the German Police Himmler.

Q. And, finally, will you give a specific example of typical transaction handled through the channels indicated on the chart?

A. The example of the arrest of the leaders of the leftist parties after the event of the 20th of July: This order was also transmitted from Himmler to Kaltenbrunner; Kaltenbrunner passed it on to Amt IV and an appropriate draft for a decree was formulated by Amt IV, signed by Kaltenbrunner and sent to the regional offices. The reports were returned from the subordinate offices back to the higher offices along the same channels.

COLONEL AMEN: May it please the Tribunal. The witness is now available to other counsel. I understand that Colonel Pokrovsky has some questions that he wishes to ask on behalf of the Soviets.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:

The testimony of the witness is important for the clarification of such questions, on the report of which the Soviet Delegation is at present working. Therefore, with the permission of the Court, I would like to ask the witness Ohlendorf a number of questions.

Q. You, witness, said that you were present twice at the mass executions. On whose orders were you an inspector at the executions?

A. I was present at the executions on my own initiative.

Q. But you said that you attended as inspector.

A. I said that I attended for inspection purposes.

Q. That was your initiative?

A. Yes.

Q. Did one of your chiefs always attend the executions for purposes of inspection?

A. Whenever possible I sent some leader of the Einsatzgruppe, but this was not always possible because of the great distance from the Einsatzgruppe.

Q. For what reasons was a person sent for purposes of inspection?

A. Please repeat the question?

Q. For what purpose was an inspector sent?

A. To determine whether or not my instructions regarding the manner of the execution were actually being carried out.

Q. Am I to understand that the inspector was to make certain that the execution had actually been carired [sic] out?

A. No, that is not a correct statement of the fact. He should simply ascertain whether the conditions which I set for the execution were actually being carried out.

Q. What manner of conditions had you in mind?

A. (1) The absence of publicity; (2) The carrying out of the execution in a military fashion. (3) The arrival of the transports and the carrying out of the liquidation without any hitch, in order to avoid unnecessary excitement. (4) The control of the property, in order to prevent appropriation by any person. There may have been other details which I no longer remember. At any rate any mistreatment, whether physical or spiritual, was to be prevented by means of these measures.

Q. You wished to make sure that, according to your opinion, a more equitable distribution of this property was effected, or did you aspire to a complete acquisition of the valuables?

A. Yes. [Note: Only the first half of the preceding question, originally spoken in Russian, was transmitted to the witness in German by the interpreter. The answer of the witness, therefore, refers only to the first half of the question.]

Q. You spoke of ill-treatment. What did you mean by ill- treatment at the executions?

A. If, for instance, the manner in which the executions were carried out was not able to prevent excitement and disobedience among the victims and the consequent execution of the order by means of violence.

Q. What do you mean by “execution of the order by means of violence”? What do you mean by violent suppression of the excitement arising amongst the victims?

A. When, as I have already stated, in order to carry out the liquidation as ordered it was necessary, for example, to resort to beating.

Q. Was it absolutely necessary to beat the victims?

A. I myself never saw such a case, but I heard of such.

Q. From whom?

A. In conversations held with members of other Kommandos.

Q. You said that cars, auto-cars, were used for the executions?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know where, and with whose assistance, the inventor, Becker, was able to materialise his inventions?

A. I remember only that it took place within Amt II of the R.S.H.A.; but I can no longer say definitely.

Q. How many were executed in these cars?

A. I did not understand the question.

Q. How many persons were executed by means of these cars?

A. I cannot give you any precise figures. The number was comparatively small – about a few hundred.

Q. You said that mostly women and children were executed in these vans. For what reason?

A. There was a special order from Himmler to that effect.

According to this order women and children were not to be executed in this manner in order to avoid the spiritual strain arising from other forms of execution and likewise not to force the soldiers, mostly married men, to shoot down women and children.

Q. Did anybody observe the behavior of the persons executed in these vans?

A. Yes, the doctor.

Q. Did you know that Becker had reported that death in these vans was particularly agonizing?

A. No. I only learned about Becker from the letter which was shown to me here in the Court. On the contrary, I know that according to the doctor’s reports the victims felt nothing at the time of death.

Q. Did any military units – I should say, Army units – take part in these mass executions?

A. As a rule, no.

Q. And as an exception?

A. In so far as I remember, in Nikolaiev and in Simferopol an observer from the Army High Command was there for a short time.

Q. For what purpose?

A. I do not know. Probably for personal information.

Q. Were military units assigned for carrying out the executions in these towns?

A. Officially, the Army did not assign any units for this purpose, since the Army as such was opposed to the liquidation.

Q. But factually?

A. Individual units voluntarily made themselves available. However, I know of no such case in the Army itself, only in the units attached to the Army (Heeresgefolge).

Q. You were the man by whose orders people were sent to their death. Were Jews only handed over for the execution by the Einsatzgruppe or were Communists – “Communist Officials” you call them in your instructions – handed over for execution along with the Jews?

A. Yes, “Communist Officials” was the name for political commissars and for those who were politically active. The mere fact of belonging to the Communist Party was not sufficient grounds for sending a man to his death.

Q. Were any special investigations made concerning the part played by persons in the Communist Party?

A. No, I said precisely the contrary, i.e., that the fact of belonging to the Communist Party was not, in itself, a determining factor in regard to persecution or in regard to execution – unless it implied a special political function.

Q. Did you hold any conversations regarding the murder vans sent from Berlin and on their work?

A. I do not understand the question.

Q. Had you any occasion to discuss, with your chiefs and your colleagues, the fact that motor vans had been sent to your own particular Einsatzgruppe from Berlin for carrying out the executions? Do you remember any such conversations?

A. I do not remember any specific conversation.

Q. Had you any information concerning the fact that members of the execution squad in charge of the executions were unwilling to use the vans?

A. I knew that the Einsatzkommandos used these gas vans.

Q. No, I have something else in mind. I wish to discover whether you received any information whether members of the execution squads were unwilling to choose the vans or whether they preferred other means of execution?

A. In other words, that they would killing by gas vans rather than by shooting?

Q. On the contrary, that they preferred execution by shooting to rather than by the gas vans.

A. Yes, I have already said so, that the gas van-

Q. And why did they prefer execution by shooting to killing in the gas vans?

A. I have already said: because, according to the opinion of the Einsatzkommandos, the unloading of the corpses was an unnecessary spiritual strain.

Q. What do you mean “an unnecessary spiritual strain”?

A. As far as I can remember the actual conditions, for instance, the state of the bodies, certain functions of the body took place which left the corpses lying in filth.

Q. You wish to say that the sufferings endured prior to death were clearly visible on the victims? Have I understood you correctly?

A. Do you mean during that moment when the gas killed them in the van?

Q. Yes.

A. I can only repeat what the doctor told me, namely, that the victims at the time of death, felt nothing.

Q. In that case your reply to my previous question, namely, that the unloading of the bodies made a very terrible impression on the members of the execution squad, becomes entirely incomprehensible.

A. As I have already said, the terrible impression was created by the whole situation and by the fouling of the vans by excreta.

COLONEL POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to ask this witness at the present stage of the Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecutor for the French Republic desire to put any questions to the witness?

M. DE MENTHON: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the counsel for Kaltenbrunner desire to cross-examine now or at a later date?

DR. KAUFFMANN (Counsel for defendant Kaltenbrunner): Perhaps I could ask a few questions now and request that I be allowed to make my cross-examination later after I have already spoken with Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. KAUFFMANN:

Q. Since when have you known Kaltenbrunner?

A. May I address a request to the Tribunal? May I sit down?

Q. Yes.

THE WITNESS: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time on a trip from Berlin to Himmler’s headquarters at the time when Kaltenbrunner was to be appointed Chief of the Sipo and S.D. Previously to that I simply knew the fact of his existence.

BY DR. KAUFFMANN:

Q. Did you come into personal contact with Kaltenbrunner through private or official conversations after he had become Chief of the R.S.H.A.?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. Do you know his attitude, as for example, on the Jewish question?

A. I am not familiar with any particular attitude of Kaltenbrunner’s.

Q. How about the question of the Church?

A. The question of the church – he deplored the anti-church course taken by Germany. We agreed that an understanding should be reached with the Church.

Q. Do you know what his thoughts were on the liquidation of civilian prisoners, parachute troops, and so on?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that Kaltenbrunner made special efforts to make use of the S.D., in order to supply the Fuehrerstab with the criticism it otherwise lacked?

A. Yes, that was the duty of the S.D. and he also gave this task his official support.

Q. A little bit more slowly.

A. It was the duty of the S.D. even before Kaltenbrunner came and he supported and officially approved the direction of this work.

Q. Do you know, either directly or indirectly, that Kaltenbrunner had no authority to give executive orders, for example, that he had no authority to put people into concentration camps or to take them from concentration camps, that all these things were handled exclusively by Himmler and Mueller?

A. I believe this question is too general for me to be able to answer correctly. The question will have to be broken down, I believe.

If you ask the question whether Kaltenbrunner could bring about executive actions, I must answer in the affirmative. If you then name Himmler and Mueller to the exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, then I must point out that according to the organisation of the R.S.H.A. Mueller was a subordinate of Kaltenbrunner, and consequently orders from Himmler to Mueller were also orders to Kaltenbrunner and Mueller was obliged to inform Kaltenbrunner of them.

On the other hand, it is certain that, particularly in regard to the concentration camps, the final decision regarding entry into or departure from was determined by Himmler. I can say that I know absolutely that – I refer to the expression that often came up, namely, “to the last washerwoman” – Himmler reserved the final decision for himself. As to whether Kaltenbrunner had no authority at all in this regard, I can make no statement.

Q. Have you personally seen the original orders and original signatures of Kaltenbrunner’s that ordered the liquidation of sabotage troops and so on?

A. No.

Q. Do you know, either directly or indirectly, that after Heydrich’s death a change, which to be sure was not a formal change, took place and that another milder course was taken by Kaltenbrunner?

A. I could not answer that question concretely.

Q. I withdraw the question. Here is another question. Did Kaltenbrunner know that you were an Einsatz Leader in the East?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave you this command?

A. Heydrich gave it to me.

Q. Heydrich gave it to you? That was before this time?

A. Yes, of course.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions at this time.

BY THE TRIBUNAL (GENERAL NIKITCHENKO):

Q. Witness Ohlendorf, can you answer up to what date the Einsatzgruppe under your command was operating?

A. The staff of the Einsatzgruppe went to the Caucasus and was then led back. As far as I can remember, a Combat Command (Kampfkommando) was formed out of it under the name “Bierkamp” which was used in fighting the Partisans. Then the Einsatzgruppe was entirely disbanded, Bierkamp went into the Government General and took a large number of his men with him.

Q. What was your occupation after Bierkamp left?

A. I think I can say that the Einsatzgruppe ceased to exist after the retreat from the Caucasus. It took over tasks similar in the Wehrmacht under the immediate command of the Commander of the Ukraine and particularly under the command of the Higher S.S. and Police Leaders.

Q. In other words, you merely entered a different circle of activity, under a different leadership, and that is all there was to it. Such functions as were performed by the Einsatzgruppe in the past continued to be carried out in the new circle?

A. No, it actually became a Combat Unit.

Q. What does that mean? Against whom were the military activities directed?

A. Within the scope of the operations which were directed against the Partisan movement.

Q. Or can you say more particularly what this group was actually doing?

A. After the retreat?

Q. When you say that the function of this group had changed when it conducted operations against the Partisans.

A. I have no concrete experiences myself. It was probably used, I believe, for reconnaissance against the Partisans and also was actually used as a military fighting unit.

Q. But did it carry out any executions?

A. I cannot make any definite statement about that as regards this period of time, for it now entered into territories in which that sort of activity no longer came into question.

Q. In your testimony you said that the Einsatz Group had the object of annihilation of the Jews and the commissars; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in what category did you consider the children? For what reason were the children massacred?

A. The order was that the Jewish population should be liquidated in its entirety.

Q. Including the children?

A. Yes.

Q. Were all the Jewish children murdered?

A. Yes.

Q. But the children of those whom you considered as belonging to the category of commissars, were they also destroyed?

A. I am do not know that the families of Soviet commissars were ever inquired after.

Q. Were you sending anywhere the reports of those executions which the group carried out?

A. The reports on the executions were regularly submitted to the R.S.H.A..

Q. No; did you personally send any reports with reference to the annihilation of thousands of people effected by you? You, personally, did you submit any report?

A. Yes, the reports came from the Einsatzkommandos who carried out the actions, to the Einsatzgruppe, and the Einsatzgruppe informed the R.S.H.A.

Q. Where to?

A. They went to the Chief of the Sipo personally.

Q. Personally.

A. Yes, personally.

Q. What was the name of this police officer? Can you give his name?

A. At the time, Heydrich.

Q. After Heydrich?

A. I did not mention any time, but that was the standing order.

Q. I am asking of you whether you continued to submit reports after Heydrich left or not?

A. After Heydrich’s death I was no longer in the Einsatz, but the order, of course, continued in effect.

Q. Have you any information whether the reports were continued after Heydrich left or were discontinued?

A. Yes, they were continued.

Q. Was the order concerning the annihilation of the Soviet people in conformity with the policy of the German Government or the Nazi Party or was it against it?

Do you understand the question?

A. Yes. One must distinguish. The order for the liquidation came from the Fuehrer of the Reich and it was to be carried out by the Reichsfuehrer S.S. Himmler.

Q. But was it in conformity with the policy which was conducted by the Nazi Party and the German Government, or was it contrary to it?

A. Politics expresses itself in activity, in so far it was thus a policy that was determined by the Fuehrer. If you ask whether this activity was in conformity with the idea of National Socialism, then I should deny that.

Q. I am talking about the practice.

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q. I understood you to say that objects of value were taken from the Jewish victims by the Jewish Council of Elders.

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Jewish Council of Elders settle who were to be killed?

A. No.

Q. How did they know who was to be killed?

A. The Jewish Council of Elders determined who were Jews and registered them individually.

Q. And when they registered them did they take their valuables from them?

A. That was done in various ways. As far as I remember, the Council of Elders was given the order to collect valuables at the same time.

Q. So that the Jewish Council of Elders would not know whether or not they were to be killed?

A. That is true.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until five minutes past two.

(A recess was taken until 1405 hours.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. KAUFFMANN:

Since when have you known Kaltenbrunner?

A. May I address a request to the Tribunal? May I sit down?

Q. Yes.

THE WITNESS: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time on a trip from Berlin to Himmler’s headquarters at the time when Kaltenbrunner was to be appointed Chief of the Sipo and S.D. Previously to that I simply knew the fact of his existence.

BY DR. KAUFFMANN:

Q. Did you come into personal contact with Kaltenbrunner through private or official conversations after he had become Chief of the R.S.H.A.?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. Do you know his attitude, as for example, on the Jewish question?

A. I am not familiar with any particular attitude of Kaltenbrunner’s.

Q. How about the question of the Church?

A. The question of the church – he deplored the anti-church course taken by Germany. We agreed that an understanding should be reached with the Church.

Q. Do you know what his thoughts were on the liquidation of civilian prisoners, parachute troops, and so on?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that Kaltenbrunner made special efforts to make use of the S.D., in order to supply the Fuehrerstab with the criticism it otherwise lacked?

A. Yes, that was the duty of the S.D. and he also gave this task his official support.

Q. A little bit more slowly.

A. It was the duty of the S.D. even before Kaltenbrunner came and he supported and officially approved the direction of this work.

Q. Do you know, either directly or indirectly, that Kaltenbrunner had no authority to give executive orders, for example, that he had no authority to put people into concentration camps or to take them from concentration camps, that all these things were handled exclusively by Himmler and Mueller?

A. I believe this question is too general for me to be able to answer correctly. The question will have to be broken down, I believe.

If you ask the question whether Kaltenbrunner could bring about executive actions, I must answer in the affirmative. If you then name Himmler and Mueller to the exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, then I must point out that according to the organisation of the R.S.H.A. Mueller was a subordinate of Kaltenbrunner, and consequently orders from Himmler to Mueller were also orders to Kaltenbrunner and Mueller was obliged to inform Kaltenbrunner of them.

On the other hand, it is certain that, particularly in regard to the concentration camps, the final decision regarding entry into or departure from was determined by Himmler. I can say that I know absolutely that – I refer to the expression that often came up, namely, “to the last washerwoman” – Himmler reserved the final decision for himself. As to whether Kaltenbrunner had no authority at all in this regard, I can make no statement.

Q. Have you personally seen the original orders and original signatures of Kaltenbrunner’s that ordered the liquidation of sabotage troops and so on?

A. No.

Q. Do you know, either directly or indirectly, that after Heydrich’s death a change, which to be sure was not a formal change, took place and that another milder course was taken by Kaltenbrunner?

A. I could not answer that question concretely.

Q. I withdraw the question. Here is another question. Did Kaltenbrunner know that you were an Einsatz Leader in the East?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave you this command?

A. Heydrich gave it to me.

Q. Heydrich gave it to you? That was before this time?

A. Yes, of course.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions at this time.

BY THE TRIBUNAL (GENERAL NIKITCHENKO):

Q. Witness Ohlendorf, can you answer up to what date the Einsatzgruppe under your command was operating?

A. The staff of the Einsatzgruppe went to the Caucasus and was then led back. As far as I can remember, a Combat Command (Kampfkommando) was formed out of it under the name “Bierkamp” which was used in fighting the Partisans. Then the Einsatzgruppe was entirely disbanded, Bierkamp went into the Government General and took a large number of his men with him.

Q. What was your occupation after Bierkamp left?

A. I think I can say that the Einsatzgruppe ceased to exist after the retreat from the Caucasus. It took over tasks similar in the Wehrmacht under the immediate command of the Commander of the Ukraine and particularly under the command of the Higher S.S. and Police Leaders.

Q. In other words, you merely entered a different circle of activity, under a different leadership, and that is all there was to it. Such functions as were performed by the Einsatzgruppe in the past continued to be carried out in the new circle?

A. No, it actually became a Combat Unit.

Q. What does that mean? Against whom were the military activities directed?

A. Within the scope of the operations which were directed against the Partisan movement.

Q. Or can you say more particularly what this group was actually doing?

A. After the retreat?

Q. When you say that the function of this group had changed when it conducted operations against the Partisans.

A. I have no concrete experiences myself. It was probably used, I believe, for reconnaissance against the Partisans and also was actually used as a military fighting unit.

Q. But did it carry out any executions?

A. I cannot make any definite statement about that as regards this period of time, for it now entered into territories in which that sort of activity no longer came into question.

Q. In your testimony you said that the Einsatz Group had the object of annihilation of the Jews and the commissars; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in what category did you consider the children? For what reason were the children massacred?

A. The order was that the Jewish population should be liquidated in its entirety.

Q. Including the children?

A. Yes.

Q. Were all the Jewish children murdered?

A. Yes.

Q. But the children of those whom you considered as belonging to the category of commissars, were they also destroyed?

A. I am do not know that the families of Soviet commissars were ever inquired after.

Q. Were you sending anywhere the reports of those executions which the group carried out?

A. The reports on the executions were regularly submitted to the R.S.H.A..

Q. No; did you personally send any reports with reference to the annihilation of thousands of people effected by you? You, personally, did you submit any report?

A. Yes, the reports came from the Einsatzkommandos who carried out the actions, to the Einsatzgruppe, and the Einsatzgruppe informed the R.S.H.A.

Q. Where to?

A. They went to the Chief of the Sipo personally.

Q. Personally.

A. Yes, personally.

Q. What was the name of this police officer? Can you give his name?

A. At the time, Heydrich.

Q. After Heydrich?

A. I did not mention any time, but that was the standing order.

Q. I am asking of you whether you continued to submit reports after Heydrich left or not?

A. After Heydrich’s death I was no longer in the Einsatz, but the order, of course, continued in effect.

Q. Have you any information whether the reports were continued after Heydrich left or were discontinued?

A. Yes, they were continued.

Q. Was the order concerning the annihilation of the Soviet people in conformity with the policy of the German Government or the Nazi Party or was it against it?

Do you understand the question?

A. Yes. One must distinguish. The order for the liquidation came from the Fuehrer of the Reich and it was to be carried out by the Reichsfuehrer S.S. Himmler.

Q. But was it in conformity with the policy which was conducted by the Nazi Party and the German Government, or was it contrary to it?

A. Politics expresses itself in activity, in so far it was thus a policy that was determined by the Fuehrer. If you ask whether this activity was in conformity with the idea of National Socialism, then I should deny that.

Q. I am talking about the practice.

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q. I understood you to say that objects of value were taken from the Jewish victims by the Jewish Council of Elders.

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Jewish Council of Elders settle who were to be killed?

A. No.

Q. How did they know who was to be killed?

A. The Jewish Council of Elders determined who were Jews and registered them individually.

Q. And when they registered them did they take their valuables from them?

A. That was done in various ways. As far as I remember, the Council of Elders was given the order to collect valuables at the same time.

Q. So that the Jewish Council of Elders would not know whether or not they were to be killed?

A. That is true.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until five minutes past two.

DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo):

Q. Witness, do you know that in April 1933 the Gestapo was created in Prussia?

A. I do not know the month, but I do know the year.

Q. Do you know what was the purpose of creating this institution?

A. To fight political opponents potentially dangerous to the State.

Q. Do you know how this institution, which was intended originally for Prussia only, was extended to the rest of the Reich?

A. Either in 1933 or in 1934, the institution of the Political Police was created in all of the States (Laender). These political police agencies were officially subordinated, in 1934, as far as I remember, to the Reichsfuehrer S.S. as Political Police Chief of the States. The Prussian Secret State Police Office represented the first central headquarters. After the creation of the “Main Office Security Police” the command tasks were delegated by Himmler to Heydrich who carried them out through the “Main Office Security Police.”

Q. Who created and instituted the Gestapo in the individual States?

A. I cannot give you an answer to this question.

Q. Do you know whether before 1933, in the area which then constituted the Reich, there had existed a similar institution, a political police force?

A. Yes, that existed, as far as I remember, at Police headquarters, Berlin, for instance, and I believe it was Department IA. At any rate political police organisations did exist.

Q. Do you know anything about the sphere of activities of this organisation which existed before 1933?

A. Yes. They were the same; at any rate their activities were fundamentally the same.

Q. Do you know anything about the recruiting of the Gestapo personnel, which, on the whole, was a new institution and consequently not constituted merely by transfer of personnel already in existence.

A. When I got acquainted with the State Police it was certainly true that the nucleus of expert personnel had been taken from the Criminal Police, and the majority of the leading men in the State Police Offices, i.e., in the regional offices of the State police, had risen from the ranks of the Department of the Interior, possibly also from the State Police Administrations, and that they had, in part, even been detailed from this Department of the Interior civil. The same was also true for the experts within Amt IV, i.e., the Gestapo.

Q. You say the majority of the officials were detailed?

A. I did not say the majority were detailed, but I said “in part.”

Q. Detailed in part! Could any of these members of the Gestapo possibly resist being taken over into the Gestapo if they did not wish it, or could they not?

A. I would not affirm that a definite resistance was possible. Some of them might have succeeded, by cunning, in avoiding it had they not wanted to go. But if one was detailed to such an office from the Department of the Interior, then, as an official, one simply had to obey. As an official he had to….

Q. The members of the Gestapo evidently consisted almost exclusively, or exclusively, of officials? Do you know anything about that?

A. That probably was no longer the case during the war. But as a rule it should be assumed that they were officials in as far as the experts were concerned. Some of them, of course, while in training, were not yet officials, and others again were merely employees, especially in the Auxiliary Forces.

Q. Can you tell me the approximate number of the members of the Gestapo towards the end of the war?

A. I estimate the total organisation of the Gestapo, including the regional offices and the Occupied Territories, at about 30,000.

Q. There was therefore within the Gestapo, a considerable percentage of officials who were merely administrative officials and had nothing to do with executive powers?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. And what was the percentage of these administrative officials who performed purely administrative functions?

A. We must, in the first instance, take into consideration that this number included the auxiliaries, as well as the women, and I cannot, offhand, immediately give you any figures. But it is certain that a proportion of one expert to three or four persons not employed in an executive capacity could not be considered excessive.

Q. Do you know anything about who was responsible for the direction and administration of the concentration camps?

A. It was Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl.

Q. Did the Gestapo have anything to do with the leadership and with the administration of the concentration camps or not?

A. According to my knowledge, no.

Q. Therefore, no members of the Gestapo were active, or in any way involved in the measures carried out in the concentration camps?

A. As far as I could judge, from a distance, only investigating officials of the State Police were active in the concentration camps.

Q. Did the Gestapo in any way participate in the mass executions undertaken by your Einsatzgruppe, which you described this morning?

A. Only as much as every other person present in the Einsatzgruppe.

DR. MERKEL: I ask the Tribunal to give me the opportunity of questioning this witness again after the return of the defendant Kaltenbrunner, since I am obliged to rely exclusively on information received from Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that the Tribunal will be prepared to allow you to put further questions at a later stage.

DR. MERKEL: Thank you.

BY DR. EXNER (Counsel for the General Staff and the O.K.W.):

Q. Witness, you mentioned the negotiations which took place in the O.K.W., which later led to an agreement between O.K.W. and O.K.H. on the one side, and the Main Security Office of the Reich (R.S.H.A.) on the other. I am interested in this point: Can you state that during the negotiations on this agreement there was any mention made regarding the extermination and the killing of Jews?

A. I cannot say anything concrete on this particular subject, but I do not believe it.

Q. You do not believe it?

A. No.

Q. In addition, you have told us that the Commander-in-Chief of the 11th Army knew about the liquidations, and I should like to ask you first of all: Do you know anything regarding the Commanders-in-Chief of the other armies?

A. In general, they must have been informed, through the speech of the Fuehrer, before the beginning of the Russian campaign.

Q. That is a conclusion that you have drawn?

A. No, it is not a conclusion that I have drawn; it is merely a report on the contents of the speech which, according to Himmler’s statement, Hitler had made to the Commanders-in-Chief.

Q. Now, you have spoken about directives given by the Commander-in-Chief of the 11th Army. What kind of directives were they?

A. I once spoke about the Commander-in-Chief in the case of Nikolaiev, i.e., that the order given at that time, for the liquidations to take place 200 kilometers away from the headquarters of the Army. On the second occasion, I did not speak about the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but about the High Command of the Army at Simferopol, because I cannot say, with any certainty, who had requested the competent Einsatzkommando at Simferopol to speed up the liquidation.

Q. That is the very question I should like to put to you: With whom in the 11th Army did you negotiate at that time?

A. I did not personally negotiate at all with anyone on this subject, since I was not the person directly concerned with these matters; but the High Command of the Army negotiated with the competent local Einsatzkommando either through the responsible army office, which at all times was in touch with the Einsatzkommandos, namely the I-C or the I-CAO, or else through the staff of the O.Q.

Q. Who gave you directives for the march?

A. The directives for the march came, as a rule, from the Chief of Staff.

Q. From the Chief of Staff? The Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the time referred to was von Manstein. Was there ever an order in this case signed by von Manstein?

A. I cannot remember any such order, but when the march was discussed there were oral consultations with von Manstein, the Chief of Staff and myself.

Q. When discussing the march?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that the Army was opposed to these liquidations. Can you state how this became evident?

A. Not the Army, but the Leaders were secretly opposed to the liquidations.

Q. Yes. But I mean, how did you recognise that fact?

A. By our conversations. Not only the leaders of the Army but also most of those who had to carry them out were opposed to the liquidations.

DR. EXNER: I thank you.

BY PROFESSOR KRAUS (Counsel for defendant Schacht):

Q. Were you acquainted with the personal records kept in your department on Reichsbank President Schacht?

A. No.

Q. Do you know why, after the 20th July, 1944, the former Reichsbank President Schacht was arrested and interned in a concentration camp?

A. Probably the occasion of the 20th of July was also favorable for a possible conviction of Reichsbank President Schacht, who was known to be inimical to the Party, whilst by means of witnesses or other methods he could be prosecuted in connection with the events of the 20th of July.

Q. Then defendant Schacht was known to your people as being inimical to the Party?

A. Yes, at least since the year 1937 or 1938.

Q. Since the year 1937 or 1938? And you also suspected him of participating in “putsches”?

A. Personally I did not suspect this, because I was not concerned with these matters at all; He was mainly under suspicion mainly because of his well-known enmity. But, as far as I know, this suspicion was never confirmed.

Q. Can you tell me, who caused Schacht to be arrested?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Then you do not know whether the arrest was ordered by the Fuehrer, by Himmler or by some subordinate authority.

A. I consider it impossible that it should emanate from any subordinate authority.

Q. Then you assume that it had been ordered by the Fuehrer?

A. At least by Himmler.

BY DR. STAHMER (Counsel for defendant Goering):

Q. Witness, if I have understood you correctly, you said that at the beginning of 1933, after the seizure of power by Hitler, the Gestapo was created in Prussia; but before that time there had already existed in Prussia an organisation with similar tasks; for instance at the Police Headquarters in Berlin with Department IA; only this organisation was opposed to National Socialism, whereas now the contrary is true. But you also had the task of keeping political opponents under observation and possibly of arresting them, thus protecting the State from these political opponents.

A. Yes.

Q. You said further that in 1933, after the seizure of power, a political police with identical tasks was also instituted in all the other States (Laender).

A. Yes, in the year 1933-1934.

Q. This political police, which existed in the various States was then centralised in 1934 and its direction handed over to Himmler?

A. It was not at first centralised, but Himmler did become Chief of Police of all the States.

Q. Now one more question. Did the Prussian Gestapo play a leading role, as far as the other States were concerned, as early as 1933 or only after Himmler took over the leadership in 1934?

A. I do not believe that the Prussian State Police, which after all was under the leadership of Reichsmarshal Goering, became, at that time, the competent authority for the other States as well.

BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for defendant Doenitz):

I am speaking as the representative of the counsel for defendant Grand Admiral Raeder.

Q. Witness, you just mentioned a speech of the Fuehrer before the Commanders-in-Chief, in which the he is supposed to have instructed the Commanders-in-Chief regarding the liquidation of Jews. Which conference do you mean by that?

A. A conference took place, shortly before the Russian campaign, with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army Groups and the Armies, at the Fuehrer’s quarters.

Q. Were the of the Commanders-in-Chief of the divisions of the Armed Forces absent?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Were you yourself present at this conference?

A. No. I have recounted this conference on the basis of a conversation I had with Himmler.

Q. Did this conversation with Himmler take place in a large circle of people or was it a private conversation?

A. It was a private conversation.

Q. Did you have the impression that Himmler stated facts, or do you consider it possible that he wished to encourage you in your difficult task?

A. No. The conversation took place much later and did not spring from such motives, but from resentment at the attitude of certain generals of the Armed Forces; Himmler wanted to say that these generals of the Armed Forces could not disassociate themselves from the events that had taken place, as they were just as responsible as all the rest.

Q. And when did this conversation with Himmler take place?

A. In May, 1945, at Flensburg.

DR. KRANZBUHLER: Thank you.

(A recess was taken until 1405 hours.)

BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Political Leaders and for defendant Sauckel).

Q. Witness, with regard to the command channels at the disposal of the R.S.H.A. for the execution of their orders and measures and for the transmission of these orders to tactical organisations, such as the S.D. and the concentration camps, did the R.S.H.A. possess their own official channels or did they rely on the channels of the Political Leaders Organisation, i.e., were these orders forwarded via the Gauleitung and the Kreisleitung?

A. I know nothing at all about it. I consider it entirely out of the question.

Q. You consider it entirely out of the question that the Gauleitung and the Kreisleitung had been informed? How was it, for instance…

A. One moment, please. You asked me whether the channels passed their way; you did not ask me whether they had been informed.

Q. Were these offices informed of the orders?

A. The Inspectors, the Gestapo, or the S.D. Leaders were considered as police or political reporters (Referenten) of the Gauleiter or the Reichsstatthalter, and these official chiefs had to report to the Gauleiter on their respective fields of activity. Just how extensively this was done, I am unable to judge. It depends on the activities and on the nature of the co-operation between the Gauleiter and these offices, but it is, in any case, inconceivable that the State Police could carry on these activities, for any length of time, without the knowledge of the responsible Party Organisations.

Q. Does this also refer to reports from lower to higher units, i.e., to the activities of the concentration camps?

A. The concentration camps were not subordinate to the State Police; I am convinced – since these were purely affairs of the Reich – that there was no such close connection between the Gauleiter and the concentration camps as there was between the Gauleiter and the permanent activities of the State Police.

Q. I also represent the defendant Sauckel. Do you know of the impressment of foreign workers by the S.S.? Foreign workers who, as a matter of fact, came from the concentration camps?

A. Only superficially.

BY HERR BABEL (Counsel for the S.S. and the S.D.).

Q. Witness, this morning you mentioned the figures of 3,000 and 30,000 for the Security Service. I should now like to know for certain how these figures are to be understood. Do the 3,000 members of the S.D., whom you mentioned this morning, represent the entire personnel of the S.D. at that time, or did they only represent that part of the units which were employed in the field with the mobile units also mentioned by you this morning?

A. No, the figures represent the total personnel including employees and women auxiliaries.

Q. Including employees and women auxiliaries. And the 30,000, which we also discussed, were they honorary members (ehrenamtliche Mitglieder) employed only in the interior of Germany?

A. Yes, as a rule, in any case…

Q. And who, to a considerable extent, belonged neither to the S.S. nor to the Party?

A. Yes.

Q. How large were the mobile units of the S.D. employed in these executions?

A. The S.D. had no mobile units and only individual members of the S.D. were detailed to regional offices elsewhere. The S.D., as a separate entity, did not act independently anywhere.

Q. In your opinion and judging by your own experience, what figure did this detailed personnel attain?

A. The figure was quite a low one.

Q. Will you please give an approximate figure.

A. I place the figure at an average of about two to three S.D. experts per Einsatzkommando.

Q. I should like to be informed of the total number of the S.S. Do you know anything about that?

A. No, I have no idea at all.

Q. No idea at all. Did any units of the S.S. Armed Forces (Waffen S.S.) and other subordinate S.S. Groups in any way participate in the Einsatzgruppen?

A. As I said this morning, in each Einsatzgruppe there was, or rather there should have been, one company of the S.S. Armed Forces (Waffen S.S.).

Q. One company. And what, at that time, was the exact strength of one company?

A. I do not know about the Waffen S.S. serving with the other Einsatzgruppen, but I estimate that my particular group employed approximately 100 men of the S.S. Armed Forces.

Q. Were “Death’s Head Units” (Totenkopf Verbaende) also involved?

A. No.

Q. Was the “Adolf Hitler Bodyguard” (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) employed in any fashion?

A. That was purely a matter of chance. I cannot name a single formation from which these S.S. Armed Forces had been seconded.

Q. Another question that was touched upon this morning: When was the S.D. created and what, at first, were their duties?

A. As far as I know, the S.D. was created in 1932.

Q. And what were their duties at that time?

A. They constituted, so to speak, the I-C [Intelligence Corps] of the Party. They were supposed to give information about Party opponents and, if necessary, to deceive them.

Q. Did these duties change in the course of time. and, if so, when?

A. Yes, after the seizure of power, the combating of political opponents was, in certain spheres, one of their principal duties, and supplying the required information on certain individuals was considered their main task. At that time an Intelligence Service, in the true sense of the word, did not yet exist; the real evolution of the S.D. machine within the field of the Home Intelligence Service only followed as from 1936-1937. From that time onwards the work changed, from the observation of individuals to technical matters. With the 1939 reorganisation, when the Main Office of the S.D. was dissolved, the handling of political opponents was completely eliminated from the work of the S.D., which work was thereafter limited to technical matters. Its duties now consisted in observing the effects of the measures carried out by the leading authorities of the Reich and the States (Laender) and in determining how the circles affected reacted to them; in addition, they had to determine what shape the moods and attitude of the people and various classes of society assumed during the course of the war. It was, as a matter of fact, the only authority supplying criticism within the Reich and reporting facts on objective lines to the highest authorities. It should also be pointed out that the Party did not, at any stage, legitimise this work until 1945. The only legal recognition of this critical work came from Reichsmarshal Goering, and that only after the beginning of the war, since he could, in this way, draw the attention of the other departments, at meetings of the Reich Defence Council, to faulty developments. This unbiased and critical work became, in fact, after 1939 the main function of the S.D. Home Intelligence Service.

Q. Another question. To what extent were units of the S.D. committed for duty in the concentration camps?

A. I would ask you, at all times to distinguish between the Home Front S.D. (Inland) working under the Head Office (Amt III) and the Foreign S.D. (Ausland). I cannot give you any information about the Foreign S.D. (Ausland), but their Chief, Schellenberg, is present in this courthouse. As far as Amt III is concerned, I know of no single case in which the representatives of the Home Front S.D. (Inland) had anything at all to do with concentration camps.

Q. Now, a question concerning you personally. From whom did you receive your orders for the liquidation of the Jews and so forth? And in what form?

A. My duty was not the task of liquidation, but I did head the staff which led the Einsatzkommandos in the field, whilst the Einsatzkommandos themselves had already received this order in Berlin, on behalf of Himmler and Heydrich, from Streckenbach. This order was renewed by Himmler at Nikolaiev.

Q. You personally were not concerned with the execution of these orders?

A. I led the Einsatzgruppe, and therefore I had the task of seeing how the Einsatzkommandos executed the orders received.

Q. But did you have no scruples in regard to the execution of these orders?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. And how is it that they were carried out regardless of these scruples?

A. Because to me it is inconceivable that a subordinate leader should not carry out orders given by the Leaders of the State.

Q. This is your own opinion. But this must have been not only your point of view but also the point of view of the majority of the people involved. Did not some of the men appointed to execute these orders ask you to be relieved of such tasks?

A. I cannot remember any one concrete case. I excluded some whom I did not consider emotionally suitable for executing these tasks and I sent some of them home.

Q. Was the legality of the orders explained to these people under false pretenses?

A. I do not understand your question; since the order was issued by the superior authorities, the question of legality could not arise in the minds of these individuals, for they had sworn obedience to the people who had issued the orders.

Q. Could any individual expect to succeed in evading the execution of these orders?

A. No, the result would have been a court martial with a corresponding sentence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, do you wish to re-examine?

COLONEL AMEN: Just a very few questions, Your Honor.

RE-EXAMINATION BY COLONEL AMEN:

Q. What organisation furnished the supplies to the Einsatz Groups?

A. The Reichssicherheitshauptamt furnished supplies.

Q. What organisation furnished weapons to the Einsatz Groups?

A. The weapons were also furnished through the R.S.H.A.

Q. What organisation assigned personnel to the Einsatz Groups?

A. The Organisation and Personnel Department of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt.

Q. And all these activities of supplies required personnel in addition to the operating members?

A. Yes.

COLONEL AMEN: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: That will do; thank you.

(The witness withdrew.)

Q. The next witness to be called by the prosecution is Dieter Wisliceny. That witness will be examined by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q. What is your name?

A. Dieter Wisliceny.

Q. Will you repeat this oath? I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath in German.)

Q. Please speak slowly and pause between each sentence.

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL BROOKHART:

Q. How old are you?

A. I am thirty-four years old.

Q. Where were you born?

A. I was born at Regulowken in East Prussia.

Q. Were you a member of the N.S.D.A.P.?

A. Yes, I was a member of the N.S.D.A.P..

Q. Since what year?

A. I entered the N.S.D.A.P. first in 1931, was then struck off the list and finally entered in 1933.

Q. Were you a member of the S.S.?

A. Yes, I entered the S.S. in 1934.

Q. Were you a member of the Gestapo?

A. In 1934 I entered the S.D.

Q. What rank did you achieve?

A. In 1940 I was promoted to S.S. Hauptsturmfuehrer.

Q. Do you know Adolf Eichmann?

A. Yes, I have known Eichmann since 1934.

Q. Under what circumstances?

A. We joined the S.D. about the same time, in 1934. Until 1937 we were together in the same department.

Q. How well did you know Eichmann personally?

A. We knew each other very well. We used the intimate “Du,” and I also knew his family very well.

Q. What was his position?

A. Eichmann was in the R.S.H.A., Chief of Department IV, Gestapo.

Q. Do you mean Section IV or a subsection, and, if so, which subsection?

A. He led Section IV-A-4. This department comprised two subsections: one for Church and another for Jewish matters.

Q. You have before you a diagram showing the position of Subsection IV-A-4-b in the R.S.H.A.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you prepare this diagram?

A. Yes, I made the diagram myself.

Q. Does it correctly portray the organisational set-up showing the section dealing with Jewish problems?

A. Yes, this was approximately the personnel of the section at the beginning of 1944.

Q. Referring to this chart and the list of leading personnel, as shown in the lower section of the paper, were you personally acquainted with each of the individuals named therein?

A. Yes; I knew all of them personally.

Q. What was the particular mission of IV-A-4-b of the R.S.H.A.?

A. This Section IV-A-4-b was concerned with the Jewish question on behalf of the R.S.H.A. Eichmann had special powers from Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, the Chief of Amt IV, and from the Chief of the Security Police. He was responsible for the so-called solution of the Jewish question in Germany and in all countries occupied by Germany.

Q. Were there distinct periods of activity affecting the Jews?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you describe to the Tribunal the approximate periods and the different types of activity?

A. Yes. Until 1940 the general policy within the section was to settle the Jewish question in Germany and in areas occupied by Germany by means of a planned emigration. The second phase, from that time on, was the concentration of all Jews in Poland and in other territories occupied by Germany in the East, by concentration in ghettos. This period lasted approximately until the beginning of 1942. The third period was the so-called “final solution” of the Jewish question, that is, the planned extermination and destruction of the Jewish race; this period lasted until October, 1944, when Himmler gave the order to stop their destruction.

(A recess was taken.)

LT. COLONEL BROOKHART:

Q. When did you first become associated with Section IV-A-4 of the R.S.H.A.?

A. That was in 1940. I accidentally met Eichmann….

Q. What was your position?

A. Eichmann suggested that I should go to Bratislava as adviser on the Jewish question to the Slovakian Government.

Q. Thereafter how long did you hold that position?

A. I was at Bratislava until the spring of 1943; then, almost a year in Greece and later, from March, 1944, until December, 1944, I was with Eichmann in Hungary. In January, 1945, I left Eichmann’s department.

Q. In your official connection with Section IV-A-4, did you learn of any order which directed the annihilation of all Jews?

A. Yes, I learned of such an order for the first time from Eichmann in the summer of 1942.

Q. Will you tell the Tribunal under what circumstances, and what was the substance of the order?

A. In the spring of 1942 about 17,000 Jews were taken from Slovakia to Poland as workers. It was a question of an agreement with the Slovakian Government. The Slovakian Government further asked whether the families of these workers could not be taken to Poland as well. At first Eichmann declined this request.

In April, or at the beginning of May, 1942, Eichmann told me that henceforward whole families could also be taken to Poland. Eichmann himself was at Bratislava in May, 1942, and had discussed the matter with competent members of the Slovakian Government. He visited Minister Mach and the then Prime Minister, Professor Tuka. At that time he assured the Slovakian Government that these Jews would be humanely and decently treated in the Polish ghettos. This was the special wish of the Slovakian Government. As a result of this assurance about 35,000 Jews were taken from Slovakia into Poland. The Slovakian Government, however, made efforts to see that these Jews were, in fact, humanely treated; they particularly tried to help such Jews as had been converted to Christianity. Prime Minister Tuka repeatedly asked me to visit him, and expressed the wish that a Slovakian delegation be allowed to enter the areas to which the Slovakian Jews were supposed to have been sent. I transmitted this wish to Eichmann, and the Slovakian Government even sent a note on the matter to the German Government. Eichmann, for the time being, gave evasive answers.

Then at the end of July or the beginning of August, I went to see him in Berlin and implored him once more to grant the request of the Slovakian Government. I pointed out to him that abroad there were rumors to the effect that all Jews in Poland were being exterminated. I pointed out to him that the Pope had intervened with the Slovakian Government on their behalf. I advised him that such a proceeding, if really true, would seriously injure our prestige, i.e., the prestige of Germany, abroad. For all these reasons I begged him to permit the inspection in question. After a lengthy discussion, Eichmann told me that this request to visit the Polish ghettos could not be granted under any circumstances whatsoever. In reply to my question “Why?” he said that most of these Jews were no longer alive. I asked him who had given such instructions and he referred me to an order of Himmler’s. I then begged him to show me this order, because I could not believe that it actually existed in writing. He….

Q. Where were you at that time? Where were you at the time of this meeting with Eichmann?

A. This meeting with Eichmann took place in Berlin, Kurfuerstenstrasse 116, in Eichmann’s office.

Q. Proceed with the answer to the previous question. Proceed with the discussion of the circumstances and the order.

A. Eichmann told me he could show me this order in writing if it would soothe my conscience. He took a small volume of documents from his safe, turned over the pages, and showed me a letter from Himmler to the Chief of the Security Police and the S.D. The gist of the letter was roughly as follows:

The Fuehrer had ordered the “final solution” of the Jewish question; the Chief of the Security Police and the S.D. and the Inspector of the Concentration Camps were entrusted with carrying out this so-called “final solution.” All Jewish men and women who were able to work were to be temporarily exempted from the so-called “final solution” and used for work in the concentration camps. This letter was signed by Himmler in person. I could not possibly be mistaken since Himmler’s signature was well known to me. I….

Q. To whom was the order addressed?

A. To the Chief of the Security Police and S.D., i.e. , to the office of the Chief of the Security Police and S.D.

Q. Was there any other addressee on this order?

A. Yes, the Inspector of the Concentration Camps. The order was addressed to both these offices.

Q. Did the order bear any classification for security purposes?

A. It was classified as “Top Secret.”

Q. What was the approximate date of this order?

A. This order was dated April, 1942.

Q. By whom was it signed?

A. By Himmler personally.

Q. And you personally examined this order in Eichmann’s office?

A. Yes, Eichmann handed me the document and I saw the order myself.

Q. Was any question asked by you as to the meaning of the words “final solution” as used in the order?

A. Eichmann went on to explain the meaning of the concept to me. He said that the planned biological destruction of the Jewish race in the Eastern Territories was disguised by the concept and wording “final solution.” In later discussions on this subject the same words “final solution” re-appeared over and over again.

Q. Was anything said by you to Eichmann in regard to the power given him under this order?

A. Eichmann told me that within the R.S.H.A. he personally was entrusted with the execution of this order. For this purpose, he had received every authority from the Chief of the Security Police; he himself was personally responsible for the execution of this order.

Q. Did you make any comment to Eichmann about his authority?

A. Yes. It was perfectly clear to me that this order spelled death to millions of people. I said to Eichmann, “God grant that our enemies never have the opportunity of doing the same to the German people,” in reply to which Eichmann told me not to be sentimental; it was an order of the Fuehrer’s and would have to be carried out.

Q. Do you know whether that order continued in force and under the operation of Eichmann’s department?

A. Yes.

Q. For how long?

A. This order was in force until October, 1944. At that time Himmler gave a counter-order which forbade the annihilation of the Jews.

Q. Who was Chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt at the time the order was first issued?

A. That would be Heydrich.

Q. Did the program under this order continue with equal force under Kaltenbrunner?

A. Yes; there was no alleviation or change of any kind.

Q. State, if you know, how long Kaltenbrunner knew Eichmann.

A. From various statements by Eichmann I gathered that Kaltenbrunner and Eichmann had known each other for a long time. Both came from Linz, and when Kaltenbrunner was made Chief of the Security Police, Eichmann expressed his satisfaction. He told me at that time that he knew Kaltenbrunner very well personally, and that Kaltenbrunner was very well acquainted with Eichmann’s family in Linz.

Q. Did Eichmann ever refer to his friendship or standing with Kaltenbrunner as being helpful to him?

A. Yes, he repeatedly said that, if he had any serious trouble, he could, at any time, go to Kaltenbrunner personally. He did not have to do that very often, since his relations with his immediate superior, Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, were very good.

Q. Have you been present when Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner met?

A. Yes; once I saw how cordially Kaltenbrunner greeted Eichmann. That was in February, 1945, in Eichmann’s office in Berlin. Kaltenbrunner came to lunch every day at Kurfuerstenstrasse 116; there the Chiefs met for their mid- day meal with Kaltenbrunner; and it was on one such occasion that I saw how cordially Kaltenbrunner greeted Eichmann and how he inquired after the health of Eichmann’s family in Linz.

Q. In connection with the administration of his Office, do you know to what extent Eichmann submitted matters to Heydrich, and later to Kaltenbrunner for approval?

A. The routine channel from Eichmann to Kaltenbrunner lay through Gruppenfuehrer Mueller. To my knowledge reports to Kaltenbrunner were drawn up at regular intervals by Eichmann and submitted to him. I also know that in the summer of 1944 he made a personal report to Kaltenbrunner.

Q. Did you have an opportunity to examine files in Eichmann’s office?

A. Yes; I frequently had occasion to examine the files in Eichmann’s office. I know that he handled all files pertaining to questions with this particular order very carefully. He was in every respect a definite bureaucrat; he immediately recorded in the files every discussion he ever had with any of his superiors. He always pointed out to me that the most important thing was for him to be covered by his superiors at all times. He shunned all personal responsibility and took good care to take shelter behind his superiors – in this case Mueller and Kaltenbrunner – and to inveigle them into accepting the responsibility for all his actions.

Q. In the case of a typical report going from Eichmann’s department through Mueller, Kaltenbrunner to Himmler – have you seen copies of such reports in Eichmann’s file?

A. Yes, such copies were naturally very often in the files. The regular channel was as follows: Eichmann had a draft made by an expert or he prepared it himself; this draft went to Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, his Chief of Department; Mueller either signed this draft himself or left the signing to Eichmann. In most cases, when reports to Kaltenbrunner and Himmler were concerned, Mueller signed them himself. Whenever reports were signed unchanged by Mueller, they were returned to Eichmann’s office, where a fair copy and one carbon copy were prepared. The fair copy then went back to Mueller for his signature, and thence it was forwarded either to Kaltenbrunner or to Himmler. In individual cases where reports to Himmler were involved, Kaltenbrunner signed them himself. I myself have seen carbon copies with Kaltenbrunner’s signature.

Q. Turning now to areas and countries in which measures were taken affecting the Jews, will you state as to which countries you have personal knowledge of such operations?

A. Firstly, I have personal knowledge of all measures taken in Slovakia. I also know full particulars of the evacuation of Jews from Greece and especially from Hungary. Further, I know about certain measures taken in Bulgaria and in Croatia. I naturally heard about the measures adopted in other countries, but was unable from my own observations or from detailed reports, to gain a clear picture of the situation.

Q. Considering the case of Slovakia, you have already made reference to the 17,000 Jews specially selected who were sent from Slovakia. Will you tell the Tribunal of the other measures that followed concerning Jews in Slovakia?

A. I mentioned before that these first 17,000 laborers were followed by about 35,000 Jews, including entire families. In August, or the beginning of September, 1942, an end was put to this action in Slovakia. The reasons for this were that a large number of Jews still in Slovakia had been granted – either by the President or by various Ministries – special permission to remain in the country. A further reason might have been the unsatisfactory answer I gave the Slovakian Government in reply to their request for the inspection of the Jewish camps in Poland. This state of affairs lasted until September, 1944; from August, 1942, until September, 1944, no Jews were removed from Slovakia. From 25,000 to 30,000 Jews still remained in the country.

Q. What happened to the first group of 17,000 specially selected workers?

A. This group was not annihilated, but all were employed for enforced labor in the Auschwitz and Lublin concentration Camps.

Q. How do you know this?

A. I know this detail because the Commandant of Auschwitz, Hoess, made a remark to this effect to me in Hungary, in 1944. He told me, at that time, that these 17,000 Jews were his best workers in Auschwitz.

Q. What was the name of that Commandant?

A. The Commandant of Auschwitz was Hoess.

Q. What happened to the approximately 35,000 members of the families of the Jewish workers that were also sent to Poland?

A. They were treated according to the order which Eichmann had shown me in August, 1942. Part of them were left alive if they were able to work. The others were killed.

Q. How do you know this?

A. I know that from Eichmann and, naturally, also from Hoess, during conversations in Hungary.

Q. What proportion of this group remained alive?

A. Hoess, at that time, in a conversation with Eichmann, at which I was present, gave the figure of the surviving Jews who had been put to work at about 25 to 30 per cent.

Q. Referring now to the 25,000 Jews that remained in Slovakia until September, 1944, do you know what was done with those Jews?

A. After the outbreak of the Slovakian insurrection in the fall of 1944, Huptsturmfuehrer [sic] Brunner, one of Eichmann’s assistants, was sent to Slovakia. My wish to go to Slovakia was refused by Eichmann. Brunner then, with the help of German police forces and also with forces of the Slovakian Gendarmerie, assembled these Jews in several camps and transported them to Auschwitz. According to Brunner’s statement, about 14,000 people were involved. A small group which remained in Camp Szered was, as far as I know, sent to Theresienstadt in the spring of 1945.

Q. What happened to these Jews after they were deported from Slovakia, this group of 25,000?

A. I assume that they also met with the so-called “final solution,” because Himmler’s order to suspend this action was not issued until several weeks later.

Q. Considering now actions in Greece about which you have personal knowledge, will you tell the Tribunal of the actions there in a chronological sequence?

A. In January, 1943, I was summoned by Eichmann to Berlin, where he told me that I was to proceed to Salonika, there to solve the Jewish problem there in co-operation with the German Military Administration in Macedonia. Eichmann’s permanent representative, Sturmbannfuehrer Wolf, had previously been to Salonika. My departure had been scheduled for February, 1942. At the end of January, 1942, I was told by Eichmann that Hauptsturmfuehrer Brunner had been nominated by him for the technical execution of all operations in Greece, and that he was to accompany me to Salonika. Brunner was not subordinate to me; he worked independently. In February, 1942, we went to Salonika and there contacted the Military Administration. As first action….

Q. With whom in the Military Administration did you deal?

A. War Administration Counsellor (Kriegsverwaltungsrat) Dr. Merten, Chief of the Military Administration with the Commander of the Armed Forces in the Salonika-Aegean theatre.

Q. I believe you used 1942 once or more in reference; did you at all times refer to 1943 in dealing with Greece?

A. That is an error. These events occurred in 1943.

Q. What arrangements were made through Dr. Merten and what actions were taken?

A. In Salonika the Jews were first of all concentrated in certain quarters of the city. There were, in Salonika, about 50,000 Jews of Spanish descent. At the beginning of March, after this concentration had taken place, a teletype arrived from Eichmann to Brunner, ordering the immediate evacuation of all Jews from Salonika and Macedonia to Auschwitz. Armed with this order Brunner and I went to the Military Administration; no objections were raised by the Administration and measures were prepared and executed. Brunner directed the entire action in Salonika in person. The trains necessary for the evacuation were requisitioned from the Transport Command of the Armed Forces. All Brunner had to do was to indicate the number of railway cars needed and the exact time at which they were required.

Q. Were any of the Jewish workers retained at the request of Dr. Merten or the Military Administration?

A. The Military Administration had requisitioned about 3,000 Jews for construction work on the railroad, which number was duly delivered. Once the work was ended, these Jews were returned to Brunner and were, like all the others, dispatched to Auschwitz. The work in question was carried out within the programme of the Todt Organisation.

Q. What was the number of Jewish workers retained for the Organization Todt?

A. Three to four thousand.

Q. Was there any illness among the Jews that were concentrated for transport?

A. In the camp proper, i.e., the concentration camp, there were no incidence of disease to report. However, in certain quarters of the city inhabited by the Jews there was a prevalence of typhus and other contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis of the lungs.

Q. What, if any, communication did you have with Eichmann concerning this typhus?

A. On receipt of the teletype concerning the evacuation from Salonika, I drew Eichmann’s attention over the telephone to the prevalence of typhus. He ignored my objections and gave orders for the evacuation to proceed immediately.

Q. Altogether, how many Jews were collected and shipped from Greece?

A. There were over 50,000 Jews; I believe that about 54,000 were evacuated from Salonika and Macedonia.

Q. What is the basis for your figure?

A. I myself read a comprehensive report from Brunner to Eichmann on completion of the evacuation. Brunner left Salonika at the end of May 1943. I personally was not in Salonika from the beginning of April until the end of May, so that the action was carried out by Brunner alone.

Q. How many transports were used for shipping Jews from Salonika?

A. From 20 to 25 transport trains.

Q. And how many were shipped in each transport?

A. There were at least 2,000, and in many cases 2,500.

Q. What kind of railway equipment was used for these shipments?

A. Sealed freight cars were used. The evacuees were given sufficient food to last them for about ten days, consisting mostly of bread, olives and other dry food. They also received water and various sanitary facilities.

Q. Who furnished this railway transportation?

A. Transport was supplied by the Rail Transport Command of the Armed Forces, i.e., the cars and locomotives. The food was furnished by the Military Administration.

Q. What did the Subsection IV-A-4 have to do with obtaining this transportation, and who in that sub-section dealt with transportation?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, you need not go into this in such great detail.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: If Your Honour pleases, this particular question, I believe, will have a bearing on the implications involving the military; I can cut down on the other details.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you spent some considerable time in describing how many of them were concentrated. Whether it was 60,000, or how many were kept for the Todt Organisation – all those details are really unnecessary.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: Very well, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: I mean, you must use your own discretion about how you cut down. I do not know what details or what facts you are going to prove.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: If Your Honour pleases, this witness, as he has testified, is competent to cover practically all details in these Balkan countries. It is not our wish to add cumulative evidence, but his testimony does furnish a complete story from the Head Office of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt through the field operations to the “final solution.”

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is he going to prove about these 50,000 Jews?

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: Their ultimate disposition at Auschwitz, as far as he knows.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can go on to what ultimately happened to them then.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the destination of these transports of Jews from Greece?

A. In every case to Auschwitz.

Q. And what was the ultimate disposition of the Jews sent to Auschwitz from Greece?

A. They were without exception destined for the so-called “final solution.”

Q. During the collection period were these Jews called upon to furnish their own subsistence?

A. I did not understand the question exactly.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, does it matter, if they were “brought to the “final solution”” which I suppose means death?

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: Your Honour, this witness will testify that 280,000,000 drachmas were deposited in the Greek National Bank for the subsistence of these people and that this amount was later appropriated by the German Military Administration. That is all I have hoped to prove by this question.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART (to the Witness): Is that a correct statement of your testimony?

A. Yes. The cash which the Jews possessed was taken away and put into a common account at the Bank of Greece. After the Jews had been evacuated from Salonika this account was taken over by the German Military Administration. About 280,000,000 drachmas were involved.

Q. When you say the Jews taken to Auschwitz were submitted to the “final solution,” what do you mean by that?

A. By that I mean what Eichmann had explained to me under the term “final solution,” that is, they were destroyed biologically. As far as I could gather from my conversations with him, this annihilation took place in the gas chambers and the bodies were subsequently destroyed in the crematories.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: If Your Honour pleases, this witness is able to testify as to actions in Hungary, involving approximately 500,000 Jews.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, then. You must use your own discretion. I cannot present your case for you.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: I have no desire to submit cumulative evidence.

Q. Turning to actions in Hungary, will you briefly outline the actions taken there and your participation?

A. After the entry of the German troops into Hungary, Eichmann went there personally with a large command. By an order signed by the head of the Security Police, I was assigned to Eichmann’s Command. Eichmann began his activities in Hungary at the end of March 1944. He contacted members of the then Hungarian Government, especially Secretaries of State Endre and von Baky. The first measures adopted by Eichmann in co-operation with these Hungarian Government officials were the concentration of the Hungarian Jews in special places and special localities. These measures were carried out zone-wise, beginning in Ruthenia and Transylvania. The action was initiated in mid-April 1944.

In Ruthenia over 200,000 Jews were affected by these measures. In consequence, impossible food and housing conditions developed in the small towns and rural communities where the Jews were assembled. On the strength of this situation Eichmann suggested to the Hungarians that these Jews be transported to Auschwitz and other camps. He insisted, however, that a request to this effect be submitted to him either by the Hungarian Government or by a member thereof. This request was submitted by Secretary of State von Baky. The evacuation was carried out by the Hungarian Police.

Eichmann appointed me Liaison Officer to Lieutenant-Colonel Ferency, charged by the Hungarian Minister of the Interior with this operation. The evacuation of Jews from Hungary began in May, 1944, and was also carried out zone by zone, first starting in Ruthenia, then in Transylvania, Northern Hungary, Southern, and Western Hungary. Budapest was to be cleared of Jews by the end of June. This evacuation, however, was never carried out, as the Regent, Horthy, would not permit it. This operation affected some 450,000 Jews. A second operation was then…

Q. Before you go into that, please, will you tell the Tribunal what, if anything, was done about organising an Einsatz Group to act in Hungary on the Jewish question?

A. At the beginning of March, 1944, a so-called Einsatzgruppe consisting of Security Police and S.D., was formed at Mauthausen near Linz. Eichmann himself headed a so- called “Sondereinsatz-Kommando” (Execution Squad) to which he detailed everybody who, in his department, had occupied some position or other. This “Sondereinsatz-Kommando” was likewise assembled at Mauthausen. All questions of personnel devolved on the then Standartenfuehrer, Dr. Geschke, Leader of the Einsatzgruppe. In technical matters Eichmann was subordinate only to the Chief of the Security Police and the S.D.

Q. What was the meaning of the designation “Special Action Commando Eichmann” in relation to the movement into Hungary?

A. Eichmann’s activities in Hungary comprised all matters connected with the Jewish problem.

Q. Under whose direct supervision was Special-Action Commando Eichmann organised?

A. I have already said that in all matters of personnel and economy Eichmann was subordinate to Standartenfuehrer, Dr. Geschke, Leader of the Einsatzgruppe. In technical matters he could give no orders to Eichmann. Eichmann likewise reported direct to Berlin on all the special operations undertaken by him.

Q. To whom?

A. Either to Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, or, in more important cases, to the Chief of the Security Police and S.D., i.e., to Kaltenbrunner.

Q. During the period in which Hungarian Jews were being collected, what, if any, contact was made by the Joint Distribution Committee for Jewish Affairs with Eichmann’s representative?

A. The Joint Distribution Committee made efforts to contact Eichmann and to try to ward off the fate of the Hungarian Jews. I myself established this contact with Eichmann, since I wanted to discover some means of protecting the half million Jews in Hungary from the measures already in force. The Joint Distribution Committee made certain proposals to Eichmann and, in return, requested that the Jews should remain in Hungary. These proposals were particularly of a financial nature. Eichmann felt himself, much against his will, obliged to forward these proposals to Himmler. Himmler thereupon entrusted a certain Standartenfuehrer Becher with further negotiations. Standartenfuehrer Becher then continued the negotiations with Dr. Kastner, Delegate of the J.D.C. But Eichmann, from the very first, endeavored to wreck the negotiations. Before any concrete results were obtained he attempted to face us with a fait accompli: in other words, he tried to transport as many Jews as possible to Auschwitz.

THE PRESIDENT: Need we go into all these conferences? Can you take us on to the conclusion of the matter?

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: The witness is inclined to be lengthy in his answers. That has been true in his pre-trial examination I will try…

THE PRESIDENT: You are examining him.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there any money involved in the meeting between Dr. Kastner and Eichmann?

A. Yes.

Q. How much?

A. In the first conversation Dr. Kastner gave Eichmann about 3,000,000 pengoes. What the sums mentioned in further conversations amounted to, I do not exactly know.

Q. To whom did Dr. Kastner give this money and what became of it?

A. It was given to Eichmann, who then turned it over to his trustee; the sum was, in turn, handed to the Commander of the Security Police and the S.D. in Hungary.

Q. These actions that you have described involving approximately 450,000 Jews being moved from Hungary – were there any official communications sent to Berlin concerning these movements?

A. Yes, as each transport left, Berlin was informed by teletype. From time to time Eichmann also dispatched a comprehensive report to the R.S.H.A. and to the Chief of the Security Police.

Q. Now, with reference to the Jews that remained in Budapest, what, if any, action was taken against them?

A. After Szalasi had taken over the Government of Hungary.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, we have not yet heard have we, what happened to these Jews from Hungary? If we have, I have missed it.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: I will ask that question now, Sir.

Q. What became of the Jews to whom you have already referred – approximately 450,000?

A. They were, without exception, taken to Auschwitz and brought to the “final solution”.

Q. Do you mean they were killed?

A. Yes, with the exception of perhaps 25 to 30 per cent. who were used for labour purposes. I here refer to a previously mentioned conversation on this matter between Hoess and Eichmann in Budapest.

Q. Turning now to the Jews remaining in Budapest, what happened to them?

A. In October-November, 1944, about 30,000 of these Jews, perhaps a few thousand more, were removed from Budapest and sent to Germany. They were to be used to work on the construction of the so-called South-East-Wall, a fortification near Vienna. They were mostly women.

They had to walk from Hungary to the German border – almost 200 kilometers. They were assembled in marching formations and followed a route specially designated for them. Their shelter and nutrition on this march was extremely bad. Most of them fell ill and lost strength. I had been ordered by Eichmann to take over these groups at the German border and direct them further to the “Lower Danube” Gauleitung for labour purposes. In many cases I refused to take over these so-called workers, because the people were completely exhausted and emaciated by disease. Eichmann, however, forced me to take them over and in this case even threatened to turn me over to Himmler to be put into a concentration camp if I caused him further political difficulties. For this same reason I was later removed from Eichmann’s department.

A large proportion of these people then died in the so- called “Lower Danube” Work Camp from exhaustion and epidemics. A small percentage, perhaps 12,000, were taken to Vienna and the surrounding area, and a group of about 3,000 were taken to Bergen-Belsen, and from there to Switzerland. Those were Jews who had been released from Germany as a result of the negotiations with the “Joint.”

Q. Summarising the countries of Greece, Hungary, and Slovakia, approximately how many Jews were affected by measures of the Secret Police and S.D. in those countries about which you have personal knowledge?

A. In Slovakia there were about 66,000, in Greece about 64,000, and in Hungary more than half a million.

Q. In the countries of Croatia and Bulgaria, about which you have some knowledge, how many Jews were thus affected?

A. In Bulgaria, to my knowledge, about 8,000; in Croatia I know of only 3,000 Jews who were brought to Auschwitz from Agram in the summer of 1942.

Q. Were meetings held of the specialists on the Jewish problem from Amt IV-A, for the names which appear on this sheet, to which we made reference earlier?

A. Yes. Eichmann was accustomed to calling a large annual meeting of all his experts in Berlin. This meeting was usually in November. At these meetings all the men who were working for him in foreign countries had to report on their activities In 1944, to my knowledge, such a meeting did not take place, because in November, 1944, Eichmann was still in Hungary.

Q. In connection with the Jews about whom you have personal knowledge, how many were subjected to the “final solution”, i.e., to being killed?

A. The exact number is extremely hard for me to determine. I have only one basis for a possible estimate, that is a conversation between Eichmann and Hoess in Vienna, in which he said that only a very few of them had been fit for work. Of the Slovakian and Hungarian Jews about 20 to 30 per cent. have been able to work. It is, therefore, very hard for me to give a reliable total.

Q. In your meetings with the other specialists on the Jewish problem and Eichmann did you gain any knowledge or information as to the total number of Jews killed under this program?

A. Eichmann personally always talked about at least 4,000,000 Jews. Sometimes he even mentioned 5,000,000. According to my own estimate I should say that at least 4,000,000 must have been affected by the so-called “final solution”. How many of those actually survived, I am not in a position to say.

Q. When did you last see Eichmann?

A. I last saw Eichmann towards the end of February, 1945, in Berlin. At that time he said that if the war were lost he would commit suicide.

Q. Did he say anything at that time as to the number of Jews that had been killed?

A. Yes, he expressed this in a particularly cynical manner. He said “he would leap laughing into the grave because the feeling that he had 5,000,000 people on his conscience would be, for him, a source of extraordinary satisfaction.”

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKHART: The witness is available for other counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecuting counsel wish to examine the witness?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no desire to ask any questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Soviet prosecutor wish to ask any questions?

COLONEL POKROVSKY: At this stage the Soviet Union does not wish to ask any questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor?

(No response. )

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the defendant Sauckel.):

Q. Witness, you mentioned the labour impressment of the Jews and named two cases, one of Jews from Slovakia, who were brought to Auschwitz and of whom those fit for work were so used; the other when, later, you spoke of such Jews who were brought from Hungary to the “South-East Wall.” Do you know whether the Plenipotentiary for Labor, Sauckel, had any connection with these actions, whether this happened on his orders and whether he otherwise had anything to do with these matters?

A. As far as the Jews from Slovakia were concerned, the Plenipotentiary for Labor had nothing to do with these matters. It was a purely internal affair for the Inspector of Concentration Camps who committed these Jews for his own purposes. Concerning the impressment of Jews for the construction of the “South-East Wall,” I cannot definitely answer this question. I do not know to what extent the construction of the “South-East Wall” was directed by the Plenipotentiary for Labor. The Jews who came up from Hungary for this construction work were turned over to the “Lower Danube” Gauleitung.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to ask the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other?

BY DR. BABEL (Counsel for S.S. and S.D.):

Q. Witness, you mentioned measures taken by the Security Police and the S.D., and you spoke about these organisations several times in your testimony. Is this merely an official designation or are we justified in concluding from your statement that the Security Service, the S.D., was participating in any way?

A. The actions mentioned were executed by Amt IV, i.e., the Gestapo. If I mentioned the Chief of the Security Police and the S.D., I did so because it was the correct designation of thier office and not because I wished mention the S.D. as such.

Q. Did the S.D. therefore participate, in any way, in the measures against the Jews mentioned by you: (1) numerically, and (2) with regard to the execution of these measures?

A. The S.D. as an organisation, was not involved. Some of the leaders, including myself, had risen from the S.D., but they had been detailed to Amt IV, i.e., the Gestapo.

Q. Did former members of the S.S. and S.D., who later became active in the Gestapo, still remain members of their original organisation, or were they exclusively members of the Gestapo?

A. No, they still remained with the S.D.

Q. And were they acting as members of the S.D. or actually by order of the Gestapo?

A. We belonged to the Gestapo for the duration of the detail. We merely remained on the S.D. payroll and were taken care of as members of their personnel. Orders were received exclusively from the Gestapo, i.e., Amt IV.

Q. In this connection I should like to ask one more question. Could an outsider ever know his way about in this maze of offices?

A. No; that was practically impossible.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other of the defendants’ counsel who wishes to cross-examine this witness? Colonel Amen? Do you wish, or Colonel Brookhart, does he wish to re- examine the witness?

COLONEL AMEN: No further questions, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That will do.

(The witness withdrew.)

COLONEL AMEN: It will take about 10 minutes, sir, to get the next witness up. I had not anticipated we would finish quite so quickly. Do you still want me to get him up this afternoon?

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any other witnesses on these subjects?

COLONEL AMEN: Not on this subject, Sir. I have two very short witnesses: one on the written agreement, as to which testimony was given this morning, between the O.K.W., and O.K.H. and the R.S.H.A., a witness who can answer the questions which the members of the Tribunal asked this morning, very briefly; and one other witness who is on a totally different subject.

THE PRESIDENT: On what subject is the other witness?

COLONEL AMEN: Well, he is on the subject of identifying two of the defendants at one of the concentration camps. I prefer not to mention these names to the defence unless you wish me to.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will call those two witnesses to-morrow?

COLONEL AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship. I do not think either of them will take more than twenty minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will go on with the evidence against the High Command?

COLONEL AMEN: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 4th January, 1946, at 1000 hours.).

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